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MAKING IT WORK:
TRIBAL INNOVATION, STATE REACTION, AND THE
FUTURE OF TRIBES AS REGULATORY LABORATORIES
Katherine Florey*
Abstract: This Article examines a growing phenomenon: even as the Supreme Court has
steadily contracted the scope of tribes’ regulatory authority, many tribes have in recent years
passed innovative laws and ordinances, often extending well beyond any comparable
initiatives at the state or local level. Recently, for example, the Navajo Nation passed a
comprehensive taxation scheme designed to discourage the consumption of unhealthy food
items and to subsidize the purchase of healthy ones—a scheme far more ambitious than the
soda tax efforts that have stalled in many cities and states. Likewise, amid national
controversy over marijuana legalization, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe sought to open a
“marijuana resort” in a state with strict anti-marijuana policies; meanwhile, other tribes have
moved in the opposite direction, banning on-reservation use of drugs and alcohol even where
it would be allowable under state law.
Yet while we are accustomed to thinking of states as Brandeisian laboratories of
democracy that pioneer innovations from which other jurisdictions can benefit, no ready
model exists for how states and tribes should interact within the realm of regulatory
experimentation. In practice, state reactions to tribal innovations have ranged from
indifference to hostility to imitation, and few doctrines or practices exist to mediate issues
that may arise from state-tribal regulatory conflict. Against this unsettled backdrop—which
includes 2016’s inconclusive Supreme Court decision in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians—this Article explores what contribution tribal regulation can and
should make to the larger patchwork of regulatory innovation among states. It attempts, first,
to survey some notable instances in which tribes have engaged in regulatory experimentation.
It then considers the ways in which tribal innovation has affected and been affected by
neighboring states, and the degree to which these effects resemble comparable dynamics in
the interstate context. It closes by recommending several policies—among them tribal
autonomy, clear delineation of tribal and state law’s respective territorial scope, and possible
federal involvement—that may serve to foster a productive climate in which states and tribes
can mutually influence and learn from each other.
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providing generous financial support for this project. Finally, I am immensely grateful to Aviva
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2014, the voters of Berkeley, California, approved by an
overwhelming margin1 a one-cent-per-ounce tax on soda (the “Berkeley

1. See City of Berkeley Sugary Beverages and Soda Tax Question, Measure D, BALLOTPEDIA
(Nov. 2014), https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Berkeley_Sugary_Beverages_and_Soda_Tax_Question,_
Measure_D_(November_2014) [https://perma.cc/D6FA-9UU4].
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tax”)—a measure described in the media as “groundbreaking”2 and the
“nation’s first.”3 The beverage industry, which has regarded such taxes
as serious threats to its business, ultimately spent more than $2 million
to defeat the measure4 and has campaigned vigorously to ensure that
similar taxes do not pass elsewhere.5 Public health researchers, by
contrast, have heralded the tax, arguing both that its very existence helps
change norms around soda consumption and that it can serve as a model
for other jurisdictions.6
Meanwhile, just days after the passage of the Berkeley tax, Navajo
Nation President Ben Shelly signed the Healthy Diné Nation Act,
establishing a comprehensive plan to encourage consumption of
healthier foods and to lower diabetes rates.7 The Act, which went into
effect in April 2015, imposes a two percent gross receipts tax on all
“minimal-to-no-nutritional-value food,” which it extensively defines and
catalogs.8 A related initiative a year earlier had removed all tribal taxes
from the sale of fresh fruits and vegetables.9 Although the Navajo

2. See Jan Dizon, Berkeley Defeats Big Soda, Imposes First Soda Tax in U.S., TECH TIMES (Nov.
6, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/19587/20141106/berkeley-defeats-big-soda-imposesfirst-soda-tax-in-u-s.htm [https://perma.cc/W8MG-RLAP].
3. See Sam Frizell, Nation’s First Soda Tax Passed in California City, TIME (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://time.com/3558281/soda-tax-berkeley/ [https://perma.cc/9S6U-BZVU].
4. See Robert Reich et al., Op-ed: The Berkeley Tax May Have Passed, But the Campaign Has
Not Ended for Big Soda, BERKELEYSIDE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.berkeleyside.com/
2015/03/19/the-berkeley-tax-may-have-passed-but-the-campaign-has-not-ended-for-big-soda/
[https://perma.cc/NTH2-ATDH].
5. Elizabeth Whitman, When Soda Taxes Fail: Coca-Cola, Pepsi Spent $100M Against Public
Health Initiatives, New Analysis Shows, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015) http://www.ibtimes.com/
when-soda-taxes-fail-coca-cola-pepsi-spent-100m-against-public-health-initiatives-new-2067433
[https://perma.cc/WVE2-WK3R].
6. Tom Lochner, Berkeley: First-in-Nation Soda Tax Begins to Show Results, THE MERCURY
NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_29137613/berkeley-first-natonsoda-tax-begins-show-results [https://perma.cc/P2VB-PGTZ].
7. See Press Release, Navajo Nation, President Shelly Signs Healthy Diné Nation Act of 2014
into Law (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.navajo-nsn.gov/News%20Releases/OPVP/2014/nov/Healthy
%20Dine%20Nation%20Act%20of%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PWK-B9NU] [hereinafter
Healthy Diné Nation].
8. See id.
9. See Leilani Clark, The Navajo Nation Will Soon Have the Country’s First-Ever Junk-Food
Tax, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/
2015/03/navajo-nation-junk-food-tax [https://perma.cc/C77M-VLL7]; Council Supports Healthy
Living By Eliminating the Sales Tax on Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, NAAT’ÁJÍ NAHAT’Á HANE’
LEGIS. BRANCH NEWS, 2014 SPRING COUNCIL SESSION (2014), http://www.navajo-nsn.gov/
PDF%20Files/2014/Naataji%20Nahat_a%20Hane%20-%202014%20Spring%20Council%20
Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY72-45L3].
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measure has received some media attention outside Indian country,10 the
Berkeley tax has been touted far more often for its “first” status, with
one public health advocate describing the Berkeley measure as “the
policy that changed the public health world.”11 Yet the Navajo initiative
is more radical, targeting not just soda but the full spectrum of food
consumption choices. It also affects more people: in 2010, the Navajo
Nation’s population was 173,667,12 more than fifty percent larger than
Berkeley’s 2010 population of 112,580.13
The Navajo Nation’s decision to embark upon such a sweeping public
health venture illustrates a growing phenomenon: in the past couple of
decades, tribes have increasingly embraced the potential that their
sovereign status offers for regulatory experimentation. Even as the
Supreme Court has steadily contracted the scope of tribes’ regulatory
authority over nonmembers,14 many tribes have in recent years passed
innovative laws and ordinances that at times extend well beyond any
comparable initiatives at the state or local level. Amid national
controversy over marijuana legalization, the Flandreau Santee Sioux
Tribe attempted to open a “marijuana resort” to attract tourists,15 while
other tribes have moved in the opposite direction, strictly prohibiting onreservation use of marijuana even where it is legal under the law of the
surrounding state.16 In the environmental arena, Elizabeth Ann Kronk
10. See, e.g., Tristan Ahtone, The Navajo Nation Just Passed a Junk Food Tax. Too Bad Junk
Food Is All You Can Buy, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 23, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
theslice/navajo-nation-junk-food-tax [https://perma.cc/XNJ4-XTX4]; Clark, supra note 9.
11. See Lochner, supra note 6.
12. See DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAJO NATION USING 2010 CENSUS AND 2010
COMMUNITY SURVEY ESTIMATES 6 (2010), http://azcia.gov/Documents/Links/DemoProfiles/
Navajo%20Nation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JD9-3ZWC].
13. See City of Berkeley 2000–2010, BAY AREA CENSUS (2010), http://www.bayareacensus.
ca.gov/cities/Berkeley.htm [https://perma.cc/WML2-U9TD]. It is also worthy of note that, because
Berkeley is part of a large metropolitan area, residents likely have more opportunities than do
members of the Navajo Nation to purchase soda in surrounding communities not subject to the tax
(and this may further diminish the tax’s impact).
14. For an overview of this trend, see generally Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J.
1 (1999).
15. See Sarah Sunshine Manning, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe Burns Crop, Suspends
Marijuana Operation, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 8, 2015), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/2015/11/08/flandreau-santee-sioux-tribe-burns-crop-suspends-marijuana-operation162363 [https://perma.cc/A9K7-SEZ3] [hereinafter Tribe Burns Crop]; Richard Walker, Let It Be
Pot: Two Washington State Tribes on Board, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/12/02/let-it-be-pot-two-washington-state-tribesboard-162613 [https://perma.cc/9CEC-9QTB].
16. See Walker, supra note 15 (describing resistance of Yakama Nation to marijuana legalization
in surrounding Washington).
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Warner has extensively documented instances of tribal experimentation
and has argued that tribes can exert a productive influence on states,
both through offering models of specific regulatory practices17 and
helping to spread broader “soft law” norms.18 Gun regulation,19
consumer protection,20 and models of justice and conflict resolution21 are
other areas in which tribes have sometimes departed from the law of
surrounding states in order to pioneer innovative policies that address
distinct tribal needs.
State and municipal reactions to such tribal innovations have ranged
from indifference22 to hostility23 to imitation.24 But all are, in some
sense, linked by a common thread: in contrast to the relationships
between sister states, where we think of states as Brandeisian
laboratories of democracy that can and do influence each other, neither
the Constitution nor established doctrine provides a ready model of how
states and tribes should interact within the realm of regulatory
experimentation.
On the one hand, this is understandable. Unlike states, tribes have
never signed on to any constitutional bargain and do not have the same
clear position of parity with respect to states as sister states do with each
other. More broadly, while tribes have responsibility to their own
members, they owe nothing in particular to states or to the federalist
system more generally. Meanwhile, although states owe tribes a certain
degree of autonomy to run their own affairs,25 the Constitution does not
oblige states to defer to tribal law in the same way they must, in some
17. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative Environmental “Laboratories,” 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 789, 792 (2015).
18. See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Justice Brandeis and Indian Country: Lessons from the
Tribal Environmental Laboratory, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 857 (2015).
19. See Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1729 (2011).
20. See FIRST NATIONS DEV. INST., BUILDING TRUST: CONSUMER PROTECTION IN NATIVE
COMMUNITIES 5 (2011) [hereinafter BUILDING TRUST].
21. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225,
244–52 (1994) (discussing tribal innovation in models of justice in conflict resolution).
22. The Healthy Diné Nation Act, for example, has received relatively little publicity outside
Indian country. See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 6 (describing importance of Berkeley tax without
mentioning Navajo tax).
23. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 15 (describing the role South Dakota’s opposition to marijuana
resort played in tribe’s decision to suspend plans for the resort).
24. See Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 838–39 (2014)
(discussing influence of tribal peacemaking processes outside Indian country).
25. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01[1] (2012) (discussing principles of
“tribal autonomy” and federal supremacy that limit states’ role in Indian country) [hereinafter
COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
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situations, to sister-state law.26 Finally, limits on tribal regulatory
jurisdiction imposed by the Supreme Court over the past few decades
may call into question the degree to which tribes may regulate anyone
who does not have a close tribal affiliation, limiting both the reach and
the effectiveness of tribal programs.27
At the same time, as several commentators have argued, tribes are in
some respects peculiarly well-positioned to engage in Brandeisian
experimentation.28 In many areas, tribes enjoy greater freedom to choose
their own course than states. For example, tribes are not bound by the
Second Amendment, meaning that tribes are able (at least in theory) to
engage in more sweeping gun regulation than may be possible in the
state arena.29 In other areas that are subject to extensive federal
regulation, such as environmental law, tribes may be permitted greater
autonomy relative to states to develop their own policies.30 Even where
tribes do not enjoy greater formal independence, they may be in practice
less likely targets than states for organized industry lobbying campaigns
or other forces that may create pressure on states to not deviate from the
status quo.31
In addition, the sheer number and diversity of tribes in the United
States32 creates myriad opportunities for innovation, multiplying both the
number of regulatory issues that one tribe or other will confront and the
possibilities for adopting varying solutions. Furthermore, because tribes
obviously have different histories from states and may have different
priorities and values, they may approach issues from a perspective that
26. See id. § 7.07[1][a]–[b] (contrasting states’ strong obligation to enforce judgments under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause with the uncertainty surrounding states’ obligations as to tribal
judgments).
27. See id. § 6.02[2][b] (discussing limits the Supreme Court has placed on tribal regulation of
nonmembers on nontribal land).
28. See Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1729 (2011) (arguing that Indian
nations are “self-selected laboratories for gun laws” that are “positioned to reclaim some of the local
control over gun regulation that has historically marked this body of law”); Singel, supra note 24, at
825–26 (discussing relevance of Brandeis’s metaphor to Indian country); Valencia-Weber, supra
note 21, at 227 (1994) (stating, in the context of restorative justice programs, that “[t]ribal courts
can be the possible laboratories for new, beneficial concepts in law”).
29. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1715.
30. See Singel, supra note 24, at 843; Warner, Laboratories, supra note 17, at 794–95.
31. For example, while the Navajo Nation was apparently subject to some lobbying by the softdrink industry to limit the scope of its junk food tax, it was able to resist such pressures. See Nigel
Duara, Navajo Nation Sees Tax on Junk Food as Way to Combat Health Problems, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-navajo-tax-20150330-story.html [https://
perma.cc/3TVH-5DUL].
32. See Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside Indian
Country, 6 NEV. L.J. 89, 89 (2005) (discussing diverse nature of tribes).
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is, from the state point of view, novel and unexpected.33 The wide range
of experiences and approaches among tribes is particularly relevant
because tribes in general often have, relative to states, smaller and more
responsive governmental structures34 that may allow them to respond
more nimbly to evolving regulatory challenges.
Yet despite this evidence of tribal innovation and state reaction, little
guidance exists for how tribes and states should relate to each other in
the regulatory arena. In the interstate context, various doctrines of
horizontal federalism—from the Full Faith and Credit Clause to choice
of law to principles limiting extraterritorial regulation—mediate how
states interact with each other, sheltering them from the policy choices
of sister states’ citizens in some instances while enabling cooperation
and borrowing in others. By contrast, the pattern of state-tribal relations
in the area of regulatory comity and competition is, statutorily and
constitutionally speaking, for the most part a blank slate.35 Moreover, the
doctrines outlining the respective spheres of state and tribal regulatory
authority are notoriously unclear.36
For at least three reasons, this is an undesirable state of affairs. First,
the blurred contours of tribal sovereignty in relation to state regulation37
make it more difficult for tribes to know the areas of law over which
they have authority and hence more difficult for them to engage in
experimentation. Second, the prevailing uncertainty is a recipe for
conflict in situations where tribal and state policy positions diverge,
particularly in situations where substantial spillover effects are
possible.38 Finally, the absence of devices for smoothing state-tribal

33. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 21, at 226–27 (noting that “[t]wentieth-century American
Indians are not copies of Anglo-Americans; as indigenous people they are engaged in jointly
preserving and changing a cultural way of life”).
34. See Singel, supra note 24, at 834 (describing tribal governance as tending to be responsive to
community concerns).
35. A notable exception to this general pattern is in the area of tribal gaming, where the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) both sets up various mechanisms for tribal-state negotiation
and—by making the games that must be discussed partially contingent on what state law allows—
sometimes provokes changes in state law in response to tribal plans. See infra notes 262–77 and
accompanying text. Part IV of this Article will discuss IGRA’s successes and failures in surveying
possible models for tribal-state interaction in this area.
36. See infra notes 319–31 and accompanying text.
37. See id.
38. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 97, 100
(2015) (cataloging many instances of “conflict between tribal and state interests” in areas such as
environmental regulation and taxation).
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relations may impede the sort of productive borrowing of successful
innovations that is common in the state context.39
Against this backdrop, this Article will both explore what contribution
tribal regulation can and should make to the larger patchwork of
regulatory innovation among states and consider what formal and
informal mechanisms might serve to enhance that contribution. While
this Article is not the first to note the potential of tribes as regulatory
laboratories40 or to offer an account of how tribes might fit into the
larger picture of federalism,41 it aims to fill a gap in the literature by
focusing on the horizontal tribal-state relationship.
Part I of this Article discusses how the model of imitation and
innovation has worked in the state context and the challenges—such as
“races to the bottom” and spillover effects—that Brandeis’s ideal of
policy innovation in state “laboratories” has faced over time. Part II will
turn to the tribal arena, looking at several areas in which tribes are
currently engaging in regulatory experimentation. Part III will discuss
state-tribal regulatory interaction, including both conflict and productive
borrowing, and will consider how the relationship between state and
tribal regulation is both like and unlike the regulatory interactions of
sister states. Part IV will close by recommending policies—including
tribal autonomy, policies promoting comity between states and tribes,
and possible federal involvement—that may serve to foster a productive
climate in which states and tribes can mutually influence and learn from
each other.
I. THE JURISDICTIONS-AS-LABORATORIES MODEL
A large literature discusses the “laboratories” model and its
relationship to issues of horizontal federalism in the interstate context.
The following section traces the history of the “laboratories” idea and
discusses the aspects of interstate experimentation most relevant to
tribes.

39. See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 28, at 1729; Valencia-Weber, supra note 21, at 227; Warner,
Laboratories, supra note 17; Warner, Lessons, supra note 18.
41. See, e.g., Singel, supra note 24.
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A. The Laboratories Metaphor in the Interstate Context
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,42 Justice Brandeis’s dissent first
put forth what has become one of the most well-worn metaphors in
American legal and political thought, in noting that “[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory” and so “try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”43 While
the notion that states are “laboratories of democracy” has taken on a life
of its own, it is worth noting the context in which Justice Brandeis made
his original observation. The Lochner-era New State Ice was a case in
which the majority invalidated an Oklahoma regulation requiring that ice
manufacturers obtain a state license before operating,44 finding that “a
regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the
common right to engage in a lawful private business . . . cannot be
upheld consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.”45 In response,
Justice Brandeis argued that state legislatures were the best judge of
local conditions and should be given wide latitude to legislate as they
saw fit.46 But in addition to arguing for the limits of judicial competence
in matters of legislative judgment, Brandeis also suggested that the need
for innovative economic regulation was vital to the national interest.
“The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency
more serious than war [i.e., the Great Depression],” Brandeis observed,47
a crisis that some believed, he went on to note, necessitated more
stringent economic regulation.48 Whatever the validity of this opinion,
Brandeis argued, it should be tested by “the process of trial and error”
that had produced “[t]he discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in
invention.”49 Further, Brandeis went on to suggest, just as
experimentation might yield solutions to the Depression, the limits that
Lochner-esque jurisprudence had imposed on “experimentation in the
fields of social and economic science,” might even have been part of its
cause.50
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

285 U.S. 262 (1932).
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 271.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 287–88.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–08.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310–11.
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The “laboratories” metaphor thus originally surfaced in a debate
about the degree to which a federal instrumentality—the Supreme
Court—should meddle in local state affairs, and it is perhaps most often
invoked in support of arguments that the federal government should
allow states to experiment without interference.51 But outside the
popular discourse in which “laboratories of democracy” may signal
resistance to what is seen as overly intrusive federal regulation,
Brandeisian experimentation also has implications for horizontal
federalism. For example, and as discussed below, commentators have
debated the implications of the permeability of state boundaries and the
probability that spillover effects from one state’s regulations on
neighboring states have for the laboratories model.
Despite the ubiquity with which the laboratories metaphor is invoked,
there is relatively little scholarship on the extent to which it is
empirically accurate—that is, whether states do in fact pioneer
innovative policies that are then, if successful, adopted elsewhere.52
Many scholars have expressed skepticism about the “laboratories” model
as a mechanism for legislative change and have identified political and
structural reasons why the model may falter. In a well-known article, for
example, Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that states are unlikely arenas
for innovation, both because of incentives that exists for states to mimic
policy initiatives first tried elsewhere rather than being the first to
experiment and because of the tendency of elected officials to protect
their jobs rather than engage in high-risk endeavors.53 Likewise, Edward
51. In a 2003 editorial in the New York Times, for example, Adam Cohen noted the irony that,
despite the fact that Brandeis was “fighting for progressive government” in urging states to step in
where the federal government had failed to regulate, the notion of robust state powers subsequently
became a “conservative rallying cry” for a hands-off federal government. See Adam Cohen,
Brandeis’s Views on States’ Rights, and Ice-Making, Have New Relevance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/07/opinion/editorial-observer-brandeis-s-views-statesrights-ice-making-have-new-relevance.html [https://perma.cc/EXP3-E8KP]. Cohen went on to note
that some liberal initiatives, such as the same-sex marriage movement, were increasingly enjoying
more success at the state level, thus perhaps recapturing Brandeis’s original belief that states should
serve as tools of progressive experimentation.
52. Most of the existing research has taken place in the field of political science, where scholars
have attempted to model the ways in which policy diffusion in federal systems might operate. See,
e.g., Frederick J. Boehmke, Policy Emulation or Policy Convergence? Potential Ambiguities in the
Dyadic Event History Approach to State Policy Emulation, 71 J. POL. 1125 (2009) (posing some
critiques of existing models); Fabrizio Gilardi & Katharina Füglister, Empirical Modeling of Policy
Diffusion in Federal States: The Dyadic Approach, 14 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 413, 439 (2008)
(developing a model of diffusion across Swiss cantons).
53. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980); see also Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovations in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1339 (2009)
(revisiting Rose-Ackerman’s work and concluding that it contains “a large grain of truth . . . . State
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L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued that “individual states will
have no incentive to invest in experiments that involve any substantive
or political risk, but will prefer to wait for other states to generate them”
and further that, even if states were to agree on cost-sharing or other
mechanisms to overcome this problem, they would have difficulty
gathering adequate data to assess whether any particular innovation had
been successful.54
Despite such skepticism, the sheer ubiquity of the laboratories
metaphor is notable. Not only is it widely cited in scholarship and case
law,55 but it is also one of the Supreme Court quotations perhaps best
known to the general public, having been quoted, for example, by
politicians as diverse as Ronald Reagan, who used his 1983 State of the
Union address to advocate “restor[ing] to States and local governments
their roles as dynamic laboratories of change in a creative society,”56 and
Ralph Nader, who argued in 2004 that progressive measures infeasible at
the federal level can nonetheless “take hold in state legislatures.”57
Further, there is at least some evidence that the ubiquitous use of the
“laboratories” metaphor is not merely empty rhetoric. Numerous recent
examples exist of new policies and regulations that have been adopted
first by one state (or, in some cases, locality), then embraced gradually
by a plurality or majority. For example, Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. argues
that the dual banking system under which states retain some regulatory
authority “has produced a continuing series of innovations,” from
checking accounts to interstate electronic funds transfer, many of which
were ultimately adopted both by other states and by the federal
government.58 Roberta Romano likewise contends that “[s]uccessful
corporate law innovations diffuse rapidly across the states,” citing the
example of allowing amendments eliminating outside director liability
and local governments do innovate. But they are unlikely to innovate in all instances at the optimal
social level, or in a way that captures the true benefits of experimentation.”).
54. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 925–26 (1994).
55. To use one measure, Westlaw indicates that New State Ice has been cited in more than 4000
cases and articles; a quick survey reveals that the vast majority of citations are to Brandeis’s
laboratories argument.
56. President Ronald Reagan, 1983 State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1983) (transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/reaganunion-1983/ [https://perma.cc/GT2N-PBFQ]).
57. Ralph Nader, State Legislatures as “Laboratories of Democracy,” COMMON DREAMS (May
31, 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/views/2004/05/31/state-legislatures-laboratories-democracy
[https://perma.cc/DJ8J-YPJF].
58. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the
Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1156–57 (1990).
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for negligence, which were pioneered in Delaware and then quickly
copied by “the vast majority of states.”59 Other recent, wide-ranging
areas in which states have borrowed from each other include the use of
state-sponsored lotteries (first adopted in New Hampshire in 1964 and
subsequently imitated by a resounding majority of states);60 so-called
“academic bankruptcy laws,” designed to give either the state legislature
or the governor the capacity to assume the operation of local school
districts that consistently fail to meet performance criteria (first passed in
Mississippi in 1982 and later adopted by at least twenty states);61 and
criminal sentencing guidelines, adopted rapidly by a large number of
states after being introduced in Minnesota in 1980.62 Notably, where
laws deal with conduct that has significant cross-border effects, such as
impaired driving, states may be particularly likely to embrace the
policies of their neighbors.63
Such examples do not mean, of course, that the laboratories model is
universally successful or that the concerns of academics are unfounded.
States may, to be sure, pass up opportunities for innovation even as they
embrace others. Further, although states often borrow policies after they
have had proven success,64 states sometimes rush to imitate each other
where there is little evidence of the efficacy of the underlying law. For
example, after Pennsylvania passed a 2004 law providing incentives for
grocers to offer more fresh food, twenty-two other states quickly
followed with similar legislation, despite the fact that there appears little
reason to believe that greater access to fresh food causes people to adopt
more healthful diets.65 Nonetheless, examples of borrowing are at least

59. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359, 2392 (1998).
60. Cletus C. Coughlin et al., The Geography, Economics, and Politics of Lottery Adoption, FED.
RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 165 (May/June 2006), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/06/05/Coughin.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9Z9-PWYX].
61. Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion, 32 AM. POL. RES.
521, 528 (2004).
62. After the Minnesota legislature adopted such guidelines in 1980, eighteen states followed suit
between 1981 and 1994. See Grossback, supra note 61, at 536.
63. See James Macinko & Diana Silver, Diffusion of Impaired Driving Laws Among US States,
105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1893 (2015) (concluding that the proportion of younger drivers and the
presence of a neighboring state with similar laws were the strongest predictors of first-time law
adoption).
64. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 59 (arguing for such an effect in corporate law).
65. See Heather Tirado Gilligan, Food Deserts Aren’t the Problem: Getting Fresh Fruits and
Vegetables into Low-Income Neighborhoods Doesn’t Make Poor People Healthier, SLATE (Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2014/02/food_deserts_and_fresh_food_access_aren_t
_the_problem_poverty_not_obesity.html [https://perma.cc/WJ8X-QDHV].
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useful evidence that states actively look to each other for regulatory
models, even if they may sometimes adopt them with excessive haste.
Further, states’ (and other jurisdictions’) experimentation may
influence other jurisdictions in more than one way: in some cases, as
with banking practices,66 states have pioneered specific legal innovations
that have then been adopted more or less wholesale in other
jurisdictions. Yet, as Shanna Singh has discussed, states and
municipalities sometimes use local law for advocacy purposes—to prove
that a particular policy is workable or to affirm (with hopes of
influencing debates elsewhere) a community’s support for particular
values.67 Singh notes that cities, following the “laboratories” model at
the local level, have adopted local policies implementing international
treaties in areas such as climate change, and such practices may make a
“mark on the national scene” by demonstrating that treaty compliance is
“not only workable but also beneficial.”68 Legal scholars often exhort
states to do even more to pioneer new and different approaches to social,
legal, and political issues. Daniel O. Conkle has argued that, in a
decentralized era, states have a significant role to play in adopting “new
and creative ways” to define religious freedom.69 Scott J. Shackleford
has suggested that states, along with firms, have served as useful arenas
for “identifying and testing best practices” in internet governance and
cybersecurity.70 Finally, not only legislatures but also state courts may
influence each other. Shane Gleason and Robert Howard have found, for
example, in a study of the diffusion of education finance reform, that
citations to the court opinions of other states “allow state courts to
transmit models of policy change and implementation from one to
another.”71 In short, abundant examples exist of state borrowing,
whether in the form of specific legislation, the more generalized spread
of certain ideas and values, or the sway that the opinions of one state’s
courts may have on the decisions of another.

66. See Wilmarth, supra note 58.
67. Shanna Singh, Note, Brandeis’s Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities as the New
Laboratories of International Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 537, 552 (2005).
68. See id.
69. Daniel O. Conkle, Free Exercise, Federalism, and the States as Laboratories, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 493, 495 (1999).
70. Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks Through Polycentric
Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1340 (2013).
71. Shane A. Gleason & Robert M. Howard, State Supreme Courts and Shared Networking: The
Diffusion of Education Policy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1485, 1511 (2014–15).
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B. Effects of State Competition and Imitation
Many scholars have not only discussed the existence of state
regulatory competition and borrowing but also mused on its
consequences. Because some of these ideas are relevant to state-tribal
regulatory competition as well, the following section discusses two: first,
the question whether regulatory competition creates an undesirable “race
to the bottom,” and second, issues relating to spillover effects and other
extraterritorial consequences that jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction regulatory
experimentation can create.
1. Races to the Bottom
Many commentators have worried that state regulatory autonomy will
result in lowest-common-denominator policies, as states attempt to
retain or enlarge their tax base to the detriment of their neighbors by, for
example, offering relocation incentives to businesses or (even more
troublingly) “diluting public welfare regulations to make themselves
more hospitable to regulated entities.”72 These “races to the bottom,” in
which each state “seeks to outdo the others’ concessions or face capital
flight as a result of inaction,”73 cause harm both to the participating
states, which are forced to make more and more concessions to industry
in order to compete with their neighbors, and the general public, which
must suffer the consequences of more lax regulation.
In a dramatic and troubling example of how races to the bottom can
take shape, Christopher L. Pederson describes the weakening of state
usury laws following the Supreme Court’s conclusion, in Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,74 that the law of the
bank’s rather than the consumer’s home state applied to an interstate
lending transaction.75 Subsequently, in a “frenzied race-to-the bottom,”

72. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 525–26 (2008); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89,
96–97 (2012) (describing “race to the bottom” as a theory under which “competition will induce
states to adopt ever lower levels of regulation in pursuit of capital investment and that this ‘race’
will leave all states worse off than they would have been had they not engaged in economic
competition at the expense of other concerns”); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 883 (2006)
(“[R]ace to the bottom theorists assert that competition among states for charters has led to the
systematic dilution of corporate law rules.”).
73. Erbsen, supra note 72, at 526–27.
74. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
75. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1121–22 (2008).
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two states (South Dakota and Delaware) repealed usury laws, “allowing
national banks headquartered there to ‘export’ the nonexistence of an
interest-rate cap to consumers in other states.”76 The remaining states, in
order to safeguard the interests of local businesses, changed their laws to
allow their own banks to charge any rate permissible in Delaware or
South Dakota.77 Though this loosening of restrictions did not apply to
small personal lenders, it bolstered their case that they should be able to
charge the same rates as large banks,78 and resulted in the weakening of
additional usury laws in a number of states.79 Although some states have
maintained stricter standards, this generally freewheeling regulatory
climate has allowed predatory payday lenders to flourish.80
While such examples appear to show that races to the bottom can and
do occur, some scholars have taken a more skeptical view of the
phenomenon, arguing that state regulatory competition overall is more
likely to have neutral or beneficial effects. Jonathan Adler, for example,
argues that empirical evidence suggests that interstate competition may
be as or more likely to produce a “race to the top” than one to the
bottom.81 He contends that while states “certainly compete with each
other to create a more favorable climate for business investment,” they
also compete “to provide the mix of goods and services that individual
taxpayers and prospective business employees might want”—which may
include, for example, progressive environmental regulations that will
attract a highly educated workforce to the state.82 Further, as Stephen L.
Willborn argues, the relationship between more onerous state regulation
and the cost-benefit calculus of any particular employer may be

76. See id. at 1121.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1123.
79. Id. at 1138 (finding that “[i]n virtually every measurable way usury law has become much
more lax since 1965”).
80. Id. at 1139. Payday lending may soon be subject to federal regulation. See Gillian B. White,
Payday Loan Rule: Progress, But Still a Long Way to Go, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/cfpb-payday-loan-rule/485294/
[https://perma.cc/Q8TF-U6EL].
81. See Adler, supra note 72, at 97; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210, 1233 (1992) (arguing that “there is no support in the theoretical literature on
interjurisdictional competition for the claim that, without federal intervention, there will be a race to
the bottom [among states] over environmental standards”); Steven L. Willborn, Labor Law and the
Race to the Bottom, 65 MERCER L. REV. 369, 370 (2014) (noting that seventy percent of recent
economics and political science articles have taken an at least somewhat skeptical view of the raceto-the-bottom effect).
82. See Adler, supra note 72, at 97.
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“complicated[] and uncertain.”83 For example, an increase in the
minimum wage in one state may raise an employer’s labor costs but may
also positively affect employee productivity;84 even if the increase is a
net detriment to employers, it may be more efficient and practical for
them to cut costs in other ways rather than moving.85
A further objection to an overriding fear of races to the bottom is that,
at least in some areas, competition may not be the sole or even primary
driver of state policies. Allen Erbsen, while not dismissing the
possibility that races to the bottom may occur, argues that in contrast to
earlier models of state behavior that focused on states’ tendency toward
“self-aggrandizement,” more recent evidence “suggests a more nuanced
approach that focuses on how politically accountable state leaders
respond to constituent preferences, which sometimes but not always
favor competitive policies.”86
The degree to which races to the bottom occur thus remains a subject
of debate. Certainly, interstate competition appears in some areas to have
fostered regulatory laxity—particularly in areas such as consumer
lending where interstate transactions are common.87 At the same time,
other literature suggests that states do not invariably engage in
competition, and that some instances of interstate competition can foster
regulation that promotes the public welfare.88
2. Spillover Effects and Extraterritoriality
A second strain of fears about state experimentation centers on
worries that states will export either their policies or those policies’
negative side effects beyond state borders. Allan Erbsen, for example,
identifies numerous potential frictions that horizontal federalism may
cause, several of which fall into this category. For example, states may
act as “havens” by adopting more permissive laws, such as more readily
granted divorces, to attract visitors; conversely, a state that wishes to
adopt more restrictive policies than its neighbors (such as a higher
drinking age) may be unable to stop its residents from traveling to more

83. See Willborn, supra note 81, at 410.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 414.
86. See Erbsen, supra note 72, at 525 n.108.
87. See Peterson, supra note 75, at 1121–22 (describing role of interstate transactions in
loosening of state usury laws).
88. See supra note 81.
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permissive states to take advantage of their laws.89 In other cases, when
large states regulate a good that is sold nationally, their market power
may allow them to set the de facto national standard—as has happened
with the disproportionate influence of California and Texas on textbooks
used in public schools.90 Other times, states may deliberately choose to
extend state law outside state borders—by, for example, trying to
regulate out-of-state conduct by local corporations91 or by applying state
law on non-compete clauses or consumer privacy to transactions
occurring in other jurisdictions.92 Finally, states may permit or even
encourage in-state conduct that causes negative externalities in other
jurisdictions (by, for example, allowing in-state activity that causes
pollution in sister states93 or by failing to discourage alcohol
consumption by residents of a neighboring state that may increase the
likelihood of accidents when they return home94).
Though these examples differ from each other, they can all be seen as
forms of spillovers, in which the policy choices of one state have
consequences, whether unintended or deliberate, for the citizens of
another. In general, scholarly commentary has tended to regard such
spillovers as uniformly undesirable. Heather Gerken and Ari Holzblatt,
for example, have catalogued (while somewhat departing from) the
scholarly consensus that “state laws that generate spillovers are an
exception to Justice Brandeis’s famous aphorism.”95 Samuel Issacharoff
and Catherine Sharkey assert that “the benefits of heterogeneity and
interstate competition fail” when Brandeisian experiments have
significant adverse consequences outside state borders.96 Robert P.
89. See Erbsen, supra note 72, at 516–19; Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political
Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856 (2002) (describing the problem
of “‘travel-evasion,’ which in effect gives citizens the power to choose which state’s laws are to
govern them on an issue-by-issue basis”).
90. See Erbsen, supra note 72, at 520.
91. See id. at 527.
92. See Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 705–08 (2015).
93. See Erbsen, supra note 72, at 523–24.
94. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 725–26 (Cal. 1976) (applying California rather
than Nevada law to Nevada conduct in a similar scenario); Florey, Conflicts, supra note 92, at 704
n.101 (discussing problems of interstate relations underlying this case). Bernhard is a particularly
pertinent example because it involved a casino, illustrating how a gaming enterprise can deliver
economic benefits to the jurisdiction in which it is located, while causing negative effects (in this
case, intoxicated driving) to be felt across the border.
95. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113
MICH. L. REV. 57, 69–70 (2014).
96. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1353, 1355 (2006).
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Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld have argued that in federal systems,
“[g]oods with negative spillovers . . . should be . . . regulated by central
government laws constraining their use.”97 Scholars have articulated a
variety of concerns about spillovers: they may impose transaction costs
on business required to monitor and abide by the laws of multiple
jurisdictions, allow states to export costs of their own regulatory regimes
to their neighbors,98 and expose parties attempting to comply with the
law to potentially inconsistent mandates.99 Moreover, spillovers may
also be problematic from a broader perspective of democratic selfdetermination; by subjecting conduct that takes place in one location to
the law of another jurisdiction, they may in effect “allow the
representatives of one state’s citizens to tell another’s what to do”100 and
“interfere with the sovereignty of other states.”101
Gerken and Holzblatt nonetheless offer a measured critique of some
anti-spillover arguments. They maintain that spillovers are inevitable, an
“absolutely routine phenomenon in a partially decentralized, highly
integrated system like our own”102—and that, despite their ubiquity, they
have rarely caused meaningful conflicts among states or their citizens.103
Indeed, as Gerken and Holzblatt provocatively speculate, spillovers may
have positive effects. For example, because spillovers may motivate
opposing sides to seek federal involvement, they can serve to “get issues
on the national policymaking agenda, which is no mean feat these
days.”104 Further, they can stymie forces in Washington that seek to
benefit from gridlock and inertia, ensuring that “blocking a policy from
being enacted at the national level is only a partial victory because the
state spillovers remain.”105 Spillovers, the authors argue, can also nudge
reluctant state politicians into action, forcing them to engage with groups

97. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1203, 1229 (1997).
98. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 95, at 71.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 73.
101. See Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENVER U. L.
REV. 289, 328 (2003).
102. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 95, at 79.
103. Id. at 85 (noting that “even in the face of pervasive spillovers, we’ve plainly muddled
through”).
104. Id. at 90.
105. Id. at 91.
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holding diverse perspectives both inside and outside the state;106 they
can play more or less the same role for individual state citizens, who
may be forced by means of spillovers to confront alternative points of
view.107
Although the negative aspects of spillovers may be overstated, it
remains a difficult task to negotiate the balance between, on the one
hand, the stasis that might result from confining states to wholly withinborder activities108 and, on the other, the risk that spillovers from other
jurisdictions will threaten states’ ability to make autonomous policy
choices.109 Further, even if it were possible to draw some ideal line
between these two dangers, the ubiquity of spillovers of all sorts makes
them difficult to prevent in practice.110 As the following sections will
discuss, these issues are also present, in slightly different form, when
tribal regulation is added to the picture.
II.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF TRIBAL INNOVATION

Though states’ legislative innovations have received the bulk of the
attention, states are not the only entities that can act as laboratories.
Local governments, for example, are often hailed for adopting cuttingedge policies that can serve as more widespread models if successful.111
Tribes, too, have embraced the possibility of regulatory experimentation.
Yet the scope of their efforts has often received little attention outside
the tribal community. The following section catalogs some recent tribal
regulatory efforts with the aim of demonstrating tribes’ activity in areas
that are also of widespread concern outside the tribal community.
Because of the sheer number of tribes in the United States, any such list
must invariably, of course, be illustrative rather than comprehensive; this
section attempts to focus on areas in which tribes have been most active
and/or areas that represent the most important policy concerns for the
nation as a whole. With that caveat in mind, the following section
106. Id. at 93–95.
107. Id. at 96.
108. See id. at 85 (“Our claim, however, is that interstate friction engenders important democratic
benefits. That’s because we worry not just about instability but stasis—not just about conflict but its
absence.”).
109. See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1115
(2009).
110. See id. at 1090.
111. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).
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discusses tribal innovations in the following areas: food policy,
marijuana regulation, consumer protection, gun regulation, restorative
justice, and environmental law.
A. Food Policy and Taxation
As earlier discussed, the Navajo Nation currently has the most
comprehensive system within U.S. borders of incentives and
disincentives designed to encourage consumption of healthful foods.
Almost as interesting as the fact of this regulation is the way in which it
arose: as a community-based response to a persistent public health issue.
The Navajo Nation, like many other tribes,112 has long faced a severe
diabetes problem, with diabetes rates that are two to four times greater
than those in non-Hispanic whites and rising.113 Obesity is also a serious
problem, described as an “epidemic” by tribal leaders.114
The idea of using a junk food tax as a means of addressing these
issues was initially proposed and later advocated for by the Diné
Community Advocacy Alliance (DCAA),115 a group founded in 2011
that describes itself as a “grassroots level” group intended “to raise
awareness, inform, educate, and mobilize community members to
combat obesity, diabetes, and other chronic health issues.”116 The group
received assistance from the Harvard-based Food Law and Policy Clinic
to address public health issues in the Navajo Nation that include high
rates of obesity and diabetes and lack of access to fresh food.117 Yet it
ultimately won support for the bill through community advocacy,
including publicizing it through stories in the Navajo Times and radio
and gaining support from local stakeholders.118
112. Dana Dabelea et al., Diabetes in Navajo Youth: Prevalence, Incidence, and Clinical
Characteristics: the SEARCH for Diabetes in Youth Study, 32 DIABETES CARE (Suppl. 2) S141,
S141–S147 (Mar. 2009).
113. See id.
114. Editorial, Navajo Nation Looks to Combat Obesity with Tax on Junk Food, DESERET NEWS
(Apr. 25, 2015), http://national.deseretnews.com/article/4233/navajo-nation-looks-to-combatobesity-with-tax-on-junk-food.html [https://perma.cc/D94U-2MP3]; see also HARVARD LAW SCH.
FOOD LAW AND POLICY CLINIC, GOOD LAWS, GOOD FOOD: PUTTING FOOD POLICY TO WORK IN
THE NAVAJO NATION 1 (2015) [hereinafter GOOD FOOD] (noting that some regions of the Navajo
Nation have obesity rates up to sixty percent).
115. See Clark, supra note 9.
116. See Diné Community Advocacy Alliance, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
dineadvocacy/info/ [https://perma.cc/YW3N-4U92].
117. See Emily M. Broad Leib, Keynote Remarks: Re-Tooling Law and Legal Education for Food
System Reform: Food Law and Policy in Practice, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1175, 1183–84 (2015).
118. See GOOD FOOD, supra note 114, at 9.
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The final Act was the culmination of a long process of discussion and
revision of the proposal, which Navajo President Shelly had initially
vetoed, based on fears that it might harm local businesses and that
insufficient funding existed for its implementation.119 Legislative
findings note that the Act is an attempt to address the Nation’s obesity
and diabetes issues120 by helping to combat the perceived “addictive”
nature of junk food and the detrimental effects of consuming sugarsweetened beverages. The Act also attempts to tackle the pervasive lack
of access to healthful foods within the Navajo Nation’s territory by
earmarking the revenue it generates for projects such as “farming and
vegetable gardens; greenhouses; farmers’ markets; [and] healthy
convenience stores.”121
The Healthy Diné Nation Act remains the only comprehensive “junk
food” tax within the borders of the United States.122 But it reflects a
cutting-edge public health trend that is being debated in communities
nationwide. Following the 2014 adoption of a soda tax in Mexico, which
some academic research suggests has been successful in curbing
consumption of sugary beverages,123 many communities within the
United States have considered analogous measures.124 Most have been
defeated following heavy spending by the American Beverage
Association (which boasts of beating back forty-five such initiatives; it
spent $12.9 million to thwart a single proposal in New York in 2010).125
Yet notable exceptions exist, including the Berkeley tax126 and a
Philadelphia tax127 that was finalized by the City Council on June 16,
2016.
119. See Healthy Diné Nation, supra note 7.
120. See Resolution of the Navajo Nation Council, CN-54-14, at 1–2 (2014), http://www.navajonsn.gov/News%20Releases/OPVP/2014/nov/Healthy%20Dine%20Nation%20Act%20of%202014.p
df [https://perma.cc/8C5Y-8G6Y].
121. Id. at 4–5.
122. See Clark, supra note 9.
123. See Anahad O’Connor, Mexican Soda Tax Followed by Drop in Sugary Drink Sales, N.Y.
TIMES: WELL BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016, 6:30 PM) http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/mexicansoda-tax-followed-by-drop-in-sugary-drink-sales/ [https://perma.cc/H6SE-WVZM].
124. See Rachel Premack, The Soda Industry Is on the Verge of Losing One of Its Biggest Battles
Ever, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2016/06/14/the-soda-industry-is-about-to-lose-one-of-its-biggest-battles-ever/ [https://perma.cc/
Y7GV-29YG].
125. See id.
126. See supra note 1.
127. See Michael Burke, Philadelphia Becomes First Major City to Pass Soda Tax, USA TODAY
(June 16, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/06/16/philadelphia-becomes-firstmajor-city-pass-soda-tax/85999128/ [https://perma.cc/Y2GK-SJDY].
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The Navajo Nation’s tax has not been free from criticism. Some
public health advocates argue that it is too low to change consumption
patterns,128 while tribe members have complained about the lack of
access to fresh, nutritious food on the reservation.129 Nonetheless, some
tribal advocates, such as Michael Roberts, president of the pro-food
sovereignty group First Nations Development Institute, see it as being a
powerful symbolic measure and a force for change. As Roberts has said
on the subject of the tax, “Indian country has a lot of places where it can
lead the nation in creating new ideas, new policies, even a new tax that
couldn’t be done anywhere else.”130
B. Marijuana Regulation
The trend toward marijuana decriminalization and legalization is
another force that has driven tribal experimentation—even though those
efforts have been hampered by a climate of persistent legal uncertainty.
In October 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidance about
the Department’s priorities in enforcing federal cannabis laws on tribal
lands that suggested it might not stand in the way of tribal decisions to
legalize marijuana.131 Yet subsequent Justice Department actions,
including raids on two California tribes’ marijuana operations, have
raised questions about the Department’s position and left many tribes
hesitant to proceed.132 Still, many tribes remain intrigued by the
opportunity that marijuana (as well as hemp) presents, and have gone
forward with legalization, cultivation, and/or sales efforts despite the
unsettled federal climate.133

128. See Alysa Landry, A Junk Food Tax in a Food Desert: Navajo Nation Tries to Curb
Unhealthy Snacking, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Apr. 2, 2015), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/2015/04/02/junk-food-tax-food-desert-navajo-nation-tries-curb-unhealthysnacking-159865 [https://perma.cc/47WG-4LM6] (quoting Kelly Brownell, dean of the Sanford
School of Public Policy at Duke University, as saying that the tax “is much too low to affect
consumption” but nonetheless may have value as a revenue-generating measure).
129. See Ahtone, supra note 10 (noting that, because of the long distances tribe members must
drive to grocery stores selling fresh food, it is impractical for many tribe members to shop anywhere
other than convenience stores that sell processed food).
130. See Landry, supra note 128.
131. See Cannabis Comes to Tribal Lands, CANNABIS WIRE, https://cannabiswire.com/
reservation [https://perma.cc/L4EV-TFP3].
132. See After Federal Raids, U.S. Tribes Cautioned About Marijuana, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18,
2015),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-federal-raids-u-s-tribes-cautioned-about-marijuana/
[https://perma.cc/2UEF-VUST] [hereinafter Raids].
133. See id.; Judge Rejects Menominee’s Hemp Arguments, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB. (May 24,
2016), http://www.startribune.com/judge-rejects-menominee-s-hemp-arguments/380624701/ [https://
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In one abortive but widely publicized experiment, the Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe in South Dakota planned to open the nation’s first
“marijuana resort,” which would have offered a “marijuana lounge” in
which guests would be able to purchase and smoke product cultivated in
the tribe’s own grow facility, along with lockers to store pipes and a
shuttle service so that guests would not have to drive under the
influence.134 Notably, tribal council members described the idea not just
as a potentially profitable venture but as an affirmation of tribal selfgovernment, particularly given that marijuana was illegal in South
Dakota, the surrounding state.135 As tribal council member Kenny
Weston put it, “[w]e have sovereignty and we have to assert it.”136
Weston saw the resort as part of a larger movement to change attitudes
about marijuana consumption imposed on tribes by outsiders: “[d]uring
boarding schools [intended to force the assimilation of Indian children],
our way of life was outlawed, and so many of our own people assumed
[marijuana] was bad. When marijuana is decriminalized, that stigma will
also fall away.”137 The tribe’s plans reached an advanced stage,
including construction of the grow facility and initial planting, as well as
the beginning of efforts to convert a bowling alley into the future
lounge.138 However, following threats by state authorities to prosecute
nonmembers who patronized the resort, as well as news of a possible
federal raid, the tribe was forced to suspend its plans.139
Tribal leaders and advocates have also seen promise in the seemingly
less-controversial cultivation of hemp.140 Traditionally employed by
some tribes for nets, bags, and ceremonial calendars, hemp can also be
used in the manufacture of many products sold commercially today and
thus offers considerable promise for tribes.141
perma.cc/UEV8-V96W] [hereinafter Judge Rejects] (describing Menominee Tribe’s lawsuit to
allow the tribe to grow hemp).
134. Sarah Sunshine Manning, Santee Sioux Assert Tribal Sovereignty, Open First Marijuana
Resort, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 6, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2015/10/06/santee-sioux-assert-tribal-sovereignty-open-first-marijuana-resort-161976
[https://
perma.cc/S824-MHKZ].
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Manning, supra note 15.
139. See id.
140. Alysa Landry, What Does Marijuana Memo Mean for Hemp Production and Traditional
Uses?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2014/12/18/what-does-marijuana-memo-mean-hemp-production-and-traditional-uses-158336
[https://perma.cc/5BGZ-7YD2].
141. Id.
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In the past few years, many states have authorized hemp production,
many of them in response to a 2014 federal law that legalized research
and pilot programs in hemp cultivation.142 In keeping with this trend, the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin legalized industrial hemp in May
2015 in order to embark upon research, conducted in partnership with
the College of the Menominee Nation, on the possibility of growing
industrial hemp.143 As part of this research, the tribe planted hemp on
tribal lands.144 Though the tribe maintains that it carefully monitored the
hemp to ensure that it stayed under the industrial THC limit of 0.3
percent, federal agents nonetheless raided the reservation in October
2015, destroying the tribe’s crops145 in an unpleasant surprise for the
tribe and advocates for tribal hemp cultivation more generally.146 The
tribe fought back by filing a lawsuit arguing that it was not bound by
Wisconsin law prohibiting hemp cultivation, but a federal court
dismissed the suit and the tribe’s future course is now unclear.147 Despite
this setback for tribal hemp efforts, another tribe, the Oglala Sioux Tribe,
has plans to experiment with hemp cultivation and hopes to obtain the
cooperation of federal and state prosecutors.148
Tribes appear to have been most successful in cannabis-related
initiatives when they are located in states that have themselves followed
trends toward liberalizing marijuana law.149 For example, subsequent to
Washington State’s decriminalization of recreational marijuana use,
some tribes located within the state also embraced new policies toward
cannabis. Among them were the Squaxin and Suquamish Tribes, which

142. See Laura Peters, Hemp: Could It Be the Future of Farming?, STAUNTON NEWS LEADER
(Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.newsleader.com/story/news/local/2017/01/19/hemp-could-futurefarming/96113934/ [https://perma.cc/42F3-PYNA].
143. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 190 F.
Supp. 3d 843, 846 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Steven Nelson, DEA Raid on Tribe’s Cannabis Crop Infuriates and Confuses
Reformers, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2015/10/26/dea-raid-on-wisconsin-tribes-cannabis-crop-infuriates-and-confuses-reformers
[https://perma.cc/K8FL-KXK5].
147. See Menominee Indian Tribe, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 854 (finding that the Controlled Substances
Act permits growing hemp “only if the laws of the State in which the hemp is grown allow the
growing and cultivation of hemp”); Judge Rejects, supra note 133.
148. Talli Nauman, OST Recognizes Legality of Growing Hemp, NATIVE SUN NEWS (June 15,
2016), http://www.nsweekly.com/news/2016-06-15/Top_News/OST_recognizes_legality_of_growing
_hemp.html [https://perma.cc/Y6UP-YY2L].
149. See Raids, supra note 132 (noting that tribes in states that permit marijuana use may “face
fewer legal challenges” to their own plans to legalize or sell the drug).
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legalized the substance and entered into arrangements with the state to
sell marijuana on tribal lands.150 At least in the case of the Suquamish,
state policy strongly influenced the change, which was “brought to our
doorstep by a neighboring government,” in the words of Suquamish
Chairman Leonard Forsman.151
It is worth noting, however, that tribes have not uniformly moved in
the direction of liberalization. Some tribes, concerned about the harmful
effects of marijuana and other narcotics on reservations, have sought to
regulate marijuana more strictly than does the surrounding state. In
Washington, some tribes have seen the state’s legalization as a chance to
affirm tribal values that condemn the use of marijuana. The remote Port
Gamble S’Klallam Reservation, located within Washington’s
boundaries, has so far declined to legalize marijuana; Kelly Sullivan, its
executive director, explained that “[s]o much of our energy is put toward
healthy lifestyles . . . . [W]e’re not going to do something just because
we can.”152 Meanwhile, the Yakama Nation—which more than a decade
ago clashed with Washington State over the tribe’s complete ban on
alcohol153—has also banned the growing or use of marijuana, both on
the reservation and (despite legal uncertainty over its power to do so) on
lands historically occupied by the tribe.154 From the Yakama Nation’s
perspective, marijuana is, in the words of the tribe’s attorney, the
“biggest problem” facing young people, warranting this decisive act.155

150. See Walker, supra note 15.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Indians and Washington State Are at Odds Over Alcohol Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/10/us/indians-and-washington-state-are-at-odds-over-alcoholban.html [https://perma.cc/9KF9-B6MY]. Because of the ravages alcoholism has caused in Indian
country, a number of tribes historically have banned alcohol, although some tribes are reconsidering
such bans amid evidence that they are ineffective in reducing alcohol consumption. See Scott
Neuman, Pine Ridge Reservation Lifts Century-Old Alcohol Ban, THE TWO-WAY: BREAKING NEWS
FROM NPR (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/08/15/212272144/
south-dakota-reservation-lifts-century-old-alcohol-ban
[https://perma.cc/DH92-8SZY];
Tony
Newman, Alcohol Prohibition Not Helping Native Americans Deal with Harms of Alcohol,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tony-newman/alcoholprohibition-not-h_b_1500462.html [https://perma.cc/6KKJ-G354].
154. See Walker, supra note 15.
155. See Jonathan Kaminsky, Indian Tribe Seeks Pot Business Ban in Part of Washington State,
REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-tribe-idUSBREA
2N12J20140324 [https://perma.cc/T345-CDQH].
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C. Consumer Protection
Tribes have taken approaches to consumer protection that vary
substantially both from those adopted by other tribes and from those of
states. On the one hand, some tribes regulate lending practices less
strictly than do surrounding states, enabling lenders to offer highinterest, short-term loans nationwide through their partnerships with
tribes.156 This phenomenon, which has been criticized by some states but
vehemently defended by some tribes, is explored in greater detail in Part
III, which discusses tribes and spillover effects.
At the same time, other tribes have enacted sweeping consumer
protection laws that are more stringent in some respects than those of
surrounding states. As of 2011, the First Nations Development Institute
published a report noting that seven tribes had incorporated consumer
protection provisions into their codes, and calling upon tribes to do
more.157 One of the seven tribes is the Navajo Nation, which in 1999
passed comprehensive consumer protection laws that “codify
unconscionable, unfair and deceptive trade business practices and set
forth regulatory and remediation systems for motor vehicle transactions,
pyramid schemes, door-to-door sales, rental-purchase agreements,
repossession requirements, advertisement disclosures and pawn
transactions.”158 Bolstering the Nation’s ability to apply these laws, the
Navajo Nation Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Service of Process Act
provides for tribal court jurisdiction over off-reservation activities by
tribe members that affect other Navajos as well as over nonmembers that
enter into consensual relationships with tribe members that cause them
injury.159 The First Nations Development Institute has praised the
Navajo measures for their “comprehensive and strong language” and
integration of tribal development goals.160 Notably, at least one state
court has expressed willingness to enforce Navajo consumer protections
under relevant state choice-of-law principles.161

156. See infra notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
157. See BUILDING TRUST, supra note 20.
158. Id. at 9; see also Robert Rosette & Saba Bazzazieh, Arizona’s Win-Win Short-Term Credit
Solution: Assisting Arizona’s Unbanked and Underbanked While Supporting Tribal SelfDetermination, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 781 (2013).
159. See BUILDING TRUST, supra note 20, at 10.
160. Id. at 13.
161. See Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 71 (N.M. 2003) (remanding case for
trial court to determine whether Navajo law regarding judicial process prior to repossession of
goods should apply).

09 - Florey.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/28/2017 2:35 PM

MAKING IT WORK

739

Other tribes have engaged in similarly far-reaching efforts, including
the Blackfeet Nation (located within Montana), which in 1999 enacted a
Consumer Protection Code that covers consumer credit, consumer sales
practices, equal credit opportunity, and truth in lending.162 The Blackfeet
Code includes a twenty-one percent annual percentage rate (APR) cap, a
more stringent restriction than exists in the surrounding state of
Montana.163 Although implementation of the cap has not been free of
glitches, including the existence of tribal lending products that exceed it,
it appears to have been influential.164 Notably, tribal and nontribal
citizens of Montana joined forces in 2010 to pass a statewide annual
interest rate cap of thirty-six percent; advocates for the measure engaged
in extensive outreach to tribe members as well as discussions with tribal
leaders about “the need to develop effective laws and infrastructure to
combat predatory lending within their own nations.”165
D. Gun Regulation
The desirability of regulating firearms continues to spark debate at the
national level in the United States. Meanwhile, although many states
have moved to regulate guns stringently, movement of guns across
borders has posed a serious threat to such regulations’ effectiveness.166
Against this backdrop, tribes occupy a unique position with respect to
guns in the era following the Supreme Court’s decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller,167 which recognized an individual Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm for “traditionally lawful”
purposes and invalidated a District of Columbia ban on handguns and
other firearms.168 Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago169
extended Second Amendment constraints by holding that the Second
Amendment was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment against

162. See BUILDING TRUST, supra note 20, at 10–11.
163. See id. at 11.
164. See id. (noting that the Blackfeet experience “represent[s] a lesson learned while
implementing progressive consumer protection legislation”).
165. See id. at 12.
166. See Gregor Aisch & Josh Keller, How Gun Traffickers Get Around State Gun Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/12/us/gun-traffickerssmuggling-state-gun-laws.html [https://perma.cc/F7PS-7UJR] (noting that “the effect of [some
states’ tougher gun] laws has been significantly diluted by a thriving underground market for
firearms brought from states with few restrictions”).
167. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
168. Id. at 577.
169. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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states.170 By contrast, the Second Amendment does not apply to tribes171
either by way of the Constitution itself or through the Indian Civil
Rights Act, which applies most of the Bill of Rights statutorily to tribes
and their members but omits the Second Amendment.172 Thus, at least in
theory, tribes enjoy complete latitude to ban firearms of any type if they
so choose. As Angela Riley has noted, this makes tribes “self-selected
laboratories for gun laws” that are “positioned to reclaim some of the
local control over gun regulation that has historically marked this body
of law.”173
Despite this potential, however, the complicated history of guns in
Indian country means that few tribes have fully availed themselves of
that possibility. Sometimes this is a deliberate policy choice. A “wide
consensus” of scholars suggests that a motivating force behind the
Second Amendment was the desire to arm whites in conflicts with
Indians.174 As a result, some tribes are less concerned with exercising
their ability to limit guns than with ensuring that tribe members’ access
to guns is not unreasonably limited.175
Nonetheless, even if tribes generally have not enacted sweeping bans,
many do restrict ownership, possession, or use of guns in some way,
through both criminal and civil provisions. Through their criminal codes,
many tribes limit the carrying of concealed weapons, require a tribally
170. Id. at 749.
171. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1715 (observing that Indian tribes remain “outside the polity in
regards to gun ownership, firmly established in a post-Heller, post-McDonald world as the only
governments within the United States that may entirely restrict or prohibit those rights guaranteed
by the Constitution’s Second Amendment”); Ann Tweedy, Indian Tribes and Gun Regulation:
Should Tribes Exercise Their Sovereign Rights to Enact Gun Bans or Stand-Your-Ground Laws?,
78 ALBANY L. REV. 885, 885 (2015) (noting that tribes “appear to have the greatest freedom to
experiment with gun laws of any sovereign in the United States,” although there are obstacles to
their making use of it).
172. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04 (2012).
173. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1729.
174. See id. at 1681.
175. As Riley notes, a small but growing number of tribal constitutions expressly protect the
individual right to bear arms. Id. at 1722. Some such provisions directly mirror the Second
Amendment (for example, the Zuni Pueblo’s constitution provides that “no member shall
be . . . denied the right to bear arms”), while others offer more limited protection (the Little River
Band of Ottawa Indians’s Consitution specifies that the tribe “in exercising the powers of selfgovernment shall not . . . [m]ake or enforce any law unreasonably infringing the right of tribal
members to keep and bear arms”). Id. at 1723. The majority of tribal constitutions do not include a
right to bear arms; these tribes are “free to choose amongst a variety of gun control options.” Id. at
1725. Riley notes that even a right-to-bear-arms provision very similar to the wording of the Second
Amendment would be interpreted in tribal court according to tribal law and traditions. A tribal-court
approach could thus potentially be different from the one that the Supreme Court has adopted in
Heller and McDonald. Id. at 1725.
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issued permit for a concealed weapon, or limit the places where guns
may be carried.176 Some tribes have sought to combat the problem of
domestic violence by permitting police seizure of guns from any home
in which domestic violence has occurred.177 Tribes also regulate gun
rights through their civil codes, which include regulation of gun
transportation and use. These may include restrictions on the use of guns
in hunting, in demonstrations, and in casinos and tribal government
buildings.178
Notably, numerous tribes do in fact regulate guns more strictly or in
different ways than do surrounding states. For example, Arizona permits
licensed concealed carrying of firearms,179 while the laws of the Navajo
Nation ban most carrying of firearms in public places,180 as do those of
other, smaller tribes within the state.181 The Rincon Band of Luiseño
Indians, which spans both Arizona and California, makes possession of a
firearm in public by anyone other than a law enforcement officer a civil
infraction—a stricter rule than exists in either surrounding state.182 In
contrast to Minnesota, which allows licensed concealed carry as well as
open carry of some firearms,183 the Prairie Island Indian Community not
only prohibits concealed carrying but bans law enforcement officers
from issuing firearm permits.184 The Mohegan Tribe requires that, to
carry a firearm within the reservation, a person must not only have a
valid Connecticut or federal permit but a “legitimate business need,” as

176. Id. at 1726.
177. Id. at 1726–27.
178. Id. at 1728.
179. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(C)(4) (2016).
180. See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 320 (2010) (making it illegal to carry a loaded
firearm on the reservation unless one of five exceptions is present: the firearm is carried by police,
by people traveling through the reservation in a private vehicle who have stored the gun in a closed
compartment, by people on their own residence or property, for traditional Navajo religious or
ceremonial use, or for hunting).
181. For example, the Tohono O’odham Nation makes it illegal to fire a gun within a quartermile of an occupied home. See TOHONO O’ODHAM CODE tit. 7, § 14.1 (2015). The Pascua Yaqui
Tribe prohibits any person from “go[ing] about” in a public place armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon, including guns and pistols, concealed or unconcealed, with the exception of peace officers
and persons participating in events involving the use of such a weapon that is sanctioned by the
Pascua Yaqui Police Department. See 4 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE § 1-490 (2016).
182. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25655 (West 2016) (authorizing licensed concealed carry); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(C)(4) (2016); RINCON BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS PEACE AND
SECURITY ORDINANCE § 2.2 (2008).
183. See MINN. STAT. § 624.714 & § 624.7181 (2016).
184. See PRAIRIE ISLAND INDIAN COMMUNITY FIREARM ORDINANCE § 1.5(C) & (F).
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determined by the tribe’s Department of Public Safety, for the
weapon.185
To the extent tribes seek to go further than state law, however, they
run into jurisdictional problems. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,186 tribes lack criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians in almost all circumstances.187 As Ann Tweedy has
noted, this makes complete criminal bans on guns problematic; if such a
ban were in place, tribe members would be prohibited from arming
themselves, while armed non-Indian criminals might be attracted to the
reservation.188 Despite this issue, at least one tribe, the Oneida Nation,
has made it a criminal offense to possess a firearm (along with a variety
of other weapons); notably, the language of the law restricts its scope to
“Native Americans.”189
Compared with criminal law, civil regulations may be more broadly
enforceable against nonmembers. Under Montana v. United States,190
which sets the governing standard in this area, tribes have a limited
ability to regulate the actions of nonmembers who enter into consensual
relationships with the tribe or pose a severe threat to tribal health and
welfare; a tribe’s power over nonmembers may be still greater when
they are acting on tribal land. Even in this area, however, uncertainty
reigns. Montana’s exceptions are notoriously narrow and difficult to
apply, and the Supreme Court has been unpredictable in the degree of
sovereign regulation it has found that Montana allows.191 Indeed, the
two scholars who have written at length about Montana’s applicability to

185. See MOHEGAN TRIBE OF INDIANS CODE § 6-121 (2016).
186. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
187. Oliphant initially barred tribes from exercising criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indians; in
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court extended the prohibition to nonmember
Indians. Congress restored tribes’ ability to prosecute nonmember Indians, however, through the socalled Duro fix. For discussion of the “fix” and its subsequent legal treatment, see United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). More recently, provisions in the renewal of the Violence Against
Women Act allow tribes to exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence and “dating
violence” offenders who are non-Indians. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
188. See Tweedy, supra note 171, at 901.
189. See ONEIDA NATION PENAL CODE, § 4M-808 (1997).
190. See 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
191. For example, the Court has found Montana’s “health and welfare” exception to apply in only
a single case that produced a highly fractured opinion. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). In that case, the Court affirmed a tribe’s
authority under Montana to apply its zoning laws to nonmember fee land within a “closed area”
consisting predominantly of forested tribal land, but not to an “open area” where land was
predominantly owned in fee by nonmembers. See id. at 438 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment
of the Court in part and concurring in part).
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gun regulations have taken different views. Riley suggests that such laws
would “clearly fit within Montana’s ‘health or welfare’ exception.”192
Tweedy, however, argues that “in fact it is nearly impossible to predict
whether a law [such as a gun restriction] will be held to pass the
[Montana] test.”193 Largely because of such jurisdictional uncertainty,
tribes have been somewhat constrained in their ability to use their civil
codes to explore new approaches to gun regulation.194
E. Restorative Justice
Tribes and tribal courts have long been pioneers in creating new
models of criminal justice; indeed, this is one of the few areas where
tribal examples have been widely influential in shaping policies outside
the tribal realm.195 Many tribes have justice systems that contain a
peacemaking element, a system of justice that “differs both from the
adversarial system and from conventional non-Indian mediation”196 and
focuses on objectives such as “balance, harmony, and healing” that are
often closely entwined with religious beliefs.197 The Navajo Nation’s
Peacemaker Courts, established in 1982 as part of “an ongoing effort to
learn about, collect and use Navajo wisdom, methods and customs in
resolving disputes,”198 are perhaps the most well-known example,199 but
numerous other tribes in various parts of the United States have

192. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1739.
193. See Tweedy, supra note 171, at 898.
194. Tweedy argues that in the context of gun regulation, tribes may be reluctant to engage in
experimentation because it may be more likely to attract the notice of a post-Heller Supreme Court
and thus have the potential to result in negative legal precedent. See Tweedy, supra note 171, at
902–04.
195. See Singel, supra note 24, at 839–40 (noting acclaim for tribal restorative justice policies by
former Attorney General Janet Reno and retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and observing that
“[s]everal non-Indian jurisdictions have already adapted Indian peacemaking and related principles
of restorative justice with remarkable success”). Carol E. Goldberg, however, has expressed
skepticism about the transferability of tribal peacemaking models in the nontribal context, arguing
that “[t]he operation of tribal peacemaking presupposes certain socio-cultural conditions, such as
religious homogeneity and strong kinship networks, that cannot be replicated in most of
contemporary non-Indian America.” See Carol E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal
Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1997).
196. See Goldberg, supra note 195, at 1011.
197. See id. at 1011–12.
198. See Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker Division: An Integrated,
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 297, 301 (2000).
199. See Goldberg, supra note 195, at 1008 (“Most commentators [on tribal peacemaking] have
in mind some image of the Navajo Peacemaker Court, even though several other tribes have
established peacemaking systems.”).
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incorporated peacemaking practices into their justice systems.200 Tribes
have often gone to considerable effort to ensure their peacemaking
processes are based in historical and empirical research, using methods
ranging from interviews with elders to focus groups.201
Tribal peacemaking itself differs across tribes, although it tends to
contain some common elements.202 In general, peacemaking is a
nonadversarial process in which parties participate themselves rather
than through representatives203 and that relies on oral rather than written
communication of community norms, promoting flexibility.204 It is
“concerned with justice as it relates to the benefit of the community, and
not just for the benefit of individual members.”205 Tribal peacemakers
are generally respected community members who often know the parties
to a dispute,206 enabling them to use their standing in the community to
articulate and enforce societal norms.207 Peacemaking is perhaps most
frequently used in minor criminal matters, but it has also been employed
for a variety of non-criminal purposes, including child custody, civil
disputes, and even “issues relating to environmental protection.”208
Several studies have found that participants in tribal peacemaking
tend to be satisfied with the process, perceiving it as a fair method of
dispute resolution that promotes positive outcomes.209 Peacemaking “has
legitimacy within the community” and provides an alternative to federal
prosecution of tribal crimes, which may be both difficult to bring about
because of overstretched federal resources and regarded as alien and
unfair by the tribal community.210 It should be noted, however, that
peacemaking reflects distinctive tribal norms, which may include a
200. See Robert V. Wolf, Widening the Circle: Can Peacemaking Work Outside of Tribal
Communities?, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION 3 (2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org/
sites/default/files/documents/Widening_Circle.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LCV-S4V7] (cataloging at
least fifteen tribes other than the Navajo Nation that make use of peacemaking).
201. See id. at 3.
202. See id. at 3–4.
203. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
235, 253 (1997).
204. See id. (noting that oral transmission of norms enables them to “be utilized by the parties as
more of a guide to achieving substantial justice, rather than as an additional source of rigidity that
might prevent the parties from adjusting their positions towards a point of compromise”).
205. See id. at 252.
206. See id. at 253.
207. See id. at 252–53.
208. See Wolf, supra note 200, at 5.
209. See id. at 10 (describing several studies).
210. See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1096 (2007).
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strong relationship between religion and law, and may lack many of the
procedures, such as rules of evidence or openness to the public, that the
Anglo justice system associates with due process.211 Some commentators
have argued that these features make the peacemaking model unsuitable
outside the tribal arena.212 Nonetheless, adoption of peacemaking
processes in non-Indian justice systems has continued apace in several
nontribal communities.213
F. Tribal Environmental Regulation
Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner has extensively chronicled novel tribal
environmental regulations and policies, arguing that tribal forays into
environmental-law innovation are valuable precisely because of the
ability of tribes to act as state-like “laboratories” to pioneer new ways of
thinking about environmental issues.214 As Warner notes, tribes may be
uniquely positioned to model environmental regulation both because of
their relative autonomy from federal law and because care for the
environment is a core value of many tribal communities.215
Warner describes many circumstances in which tribal law has
expanded upon environmental protections enacted by the federal
government or surrounding states, sometimes creating effects in
nontribal communities as well. For example, the Isleta Pueblo,
downstream from the city of Albuquerque, enacted exacting water
quality standards that required Albuquerque to take additional pollution
control measures; the Tenth Circuit upheld the standards against legal
challenge.216 Likewise, many tribes have adopted regulations that both
go beyond what federal law requires and contain provisions intended to
apply outside the tribal community.217 In some cases, tribal regulation
has exceeded federal law in ways that highlight distinctive tribal values;
for example, the White Mountain Apache Tribe has adopted water
regulations that, while mirroring federal law in many regards,
incorporate concerns for the cultural, scenic, and religious significance
211. See id. at 1097–98.
212. See Goldberg, supra note 195, at 1018–19.
213. See Wolf, supra note 200.
214. See Warner, supra note 17, at 792 (2015) (“Considering sources of tribal experimentation is
particularly timely, as environmental regulatory innovation is needed now.”).
215. Id. at 794.
216. See id. at 803–04.
217. See id. at 823 (noting that the Hualapai Tribe has indicated its intent to apply its water
standards to non-Indians as well as Indians by “incorporating language similar to the second
Montana exception”).
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of certain bodies of water.218 Warner sees the tribal trend toward
recognizing such concerns as “an example of how tribes are truly
innovating within the field of environmental law, as the federal
equivalents do not contain anything similar to . . . stringent [tribal]
cultural, religious, and spiritual protections.”219 Tribes have also been
active in the area of climate change. Several tribes inhabiting the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (“CSKT”) Flathead
Reservation in Montana have developed a comprehensive plan to assess
and respond to climate change risks, in many cases drawing on
traditional tribal knowledge such as fostering the growth of native
plants.220
In a more recent article, Warner argues that, even where tribal codes
have not engaged in such specific innovations, tribes have experimented
in the area of “soft law”—non-code and not necessarily binding221 legal
principles found in tribal “constitutional provisions, vision statements,
customary law, tribal court decisions,” and participation in intertribal
organizations.222 Ultimately, Warner concludes that “[i]n the realm of
tribal environmental law, there is much to learn from the tribal
‘laboratory’”223 in terms of both specific code provisions224 and soft-law
innovation, which can be especially useful to other sovereigns because
this type of law “easily fills existing regulatory gaps and traverses
different regulatory jurisdictions.”225
III. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND THE
TRIBAL CONTEXT
Tribes are thus currently engaged in active policy experimentation of
the sort that the “laboratories” model would appear to value. Given this
fact, how well do our current models of experimentation, imitation, and
competition developed in the interstate context apply to tribes? More
precisely, is it possible for tribes and states to engage in the same sort of
productive borrowing and influence that often occurs in the state
context? At the same time, as tribes stake out bold policies that
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See id. at 824–25.
See id. at 833.
See id. at 839–42.
See Warner, supra note 18, at 889.
See id. at 859.
See Warner, supra note 17, at 846.
See id.
See Warner, supra note 18, at 860.
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sometimes diverge from surrounding state law, how likely are such
differences to create races to the bottom, spillovers, and other negative
effects of horizontal federalism? The following section explores these
issues, arguing that tribes are in many ways ideally positioned to serve
as regulatory laboratories. It then goes on to consider obstacles to
smooth operation of the laboratories model in the tribal-state context:
first, pressures on tribes not to depart too radically from surrounding
state law, and second, the issue of tribal spillovers in a realm of
jurisdictional uncertainty.
A. The Potential of Tribal Laboratories
As the preceding section has argued, tribes have engaged in
innovation in many notable areas. But what does it mean, exactly, to
expand the Brandeisian model to encompass tribes, and is it appropriate
to do so? The following section addresses this question, looking first at
the qualities of tribes that make them likely to be regulatory trailblazers,
and then considering the degree to which tribal models may be
applicable or useful to nontribal governments.
1. Tribes as Innovators
Although tribal regulatory experimentation often receives less
publicity than comparable state initiatives,226 both tribes and
commentators have long understood tribes’ potential as regulatory
pioneers. As early as 1965, Vine Deloria, Jr., then-executive director of
the National Congress on American Indians, described tribes as
“laboratories of the future” in making the case for tribal sovereignty
before a Senate subcommittee.227 Academic discussions of innovative
tribal policies frequently invoke the “laboratories” concept,228 and tribes

226. See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text (calling attention to disparity in media
coverage of Berkeley soda tax and Navajo junk food tax).
227. See To Protect the Constitutional Rights of American Indians, 1965: Hearings on S. 961, S.
962, S. 963, S. 964, S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 194–95 (1965)
(statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians);
Valencia-Weber, supra note 21, at 261 (discussing significance of Deloria’s statement).
228. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1729 (describing tribes as “self-selected laboratories for gun
laws”); Singel, supra note 24, at 825–26 (arguing that the ability of tribes to serve as Brandeisian
laboratories is one of the many benefits of an expanded view of federalism that includes tribes);
Valencia-Weber, supra note 21, at 261 (arguing that “[t]ribal court innovation is akin to the
American political concept that states are the laboratories for national political change”); Warner,
supra note 17 (devoting article to premise that tribes can serve as environmental-law laboratories).
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have received outside recognition for their often cutting-edge regulations
and policies.229
Many distinct features of tribes in the United States support their
potential as policy laboratories. To begin with, the variegated tribal
landscape provides abundant opportunities to test a variety of regulations
in a multiplicity of settings. As of 2016, there were 566 federally
recognized tribes in the United States,230 as well as many additional
tribes that, while recognized only by states, nonetheless function as
cohesive governments.231 Tribes are not just numerous but extremely
diverse. Tribes are differently situated in important ways: their degree of
wealth or poverty, the characteristics of the land they occupy, the
demographics of their members, and virtually any other quality that
might be relevant to choosing governmental policies.232 Tribal
governments vary as well, with tribes choosing different governmental
structures based on cultural tradition and economic need. As Wenona
Singel has argued, “tribal governance represents authentic pluralism.”233
The combination of tribal diversity and responsive government means
that tribal regulation can be closely targeted to specific populations and
their particular challenges. The Navajo Nation’s soda and junk food tax,
for example, was driven in large part by concerns by citizens and tribal
leaders about the Nation’s high diabetes and obesity rates.234
Moreover, even though tribes are different from each other, they tend
to share some characteristics that make them, on the whole, better suited
in some ways to innovation than states. Tribal governance is often
flexible and community-based,235 enabling tribes to respond to evolving
social and political conditions perhaps more nimbly than larger and
slower-moving state governments. Tribes also tend to have a
governmental culture responsive to change. Because of tribes’ long
historical experience of having to adapt to Anglo-American legal and
229. See Singel, supra note 24, at 838–39 (discussing disproportionate representation of tribes as
recipients of the Harvard University Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation awards
for government programs).
230. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FEDERAL AND STATE RECOGNIZED
TRIBES (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized tribes.aspx [https://perma.cc/YV4H-KSKB].
231. See id. (listing state-recognized tribes).
232. See Minzner, supra note 32, at 89 (noting, among other differences, that tribes “range in size
from tremendous to tiny” and that some have economic profiles that “rival the richest towns in the
United States” while others are “some of the poorest communities in the country”).
233. See Singel, supra note 24, at 838.
234. See supra note 114.
235. See Singel, supra note 24, at 834.
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political norms, they have developed, in the words of Gloria ValenciaWeber, the “pervasive characteristic” of having the “capacity to change
as an evolving culture” by incorporating elements of both tradition and
innovation.236 As Wenona Singel notes, tribal governments also tend to
have extensive experience with intergovernmental cooperation, which is
often a necessity because of limits on tribal jurisdiction.237 Finally, the
desperate economic need of many tribes has forced tribal governments to
be creative in formulating new strategies for economic development.238
Many of these factors make tribes ideal pioneers of new legislative
ideas.
In some cases, tribes can also be more independent of the forces that
impede innovation at the state or local level. Many commentators have
expressed concern that the effectiveness of state “laboratories” may be
inhibited by external pressures on elected officials to reaffirm the status
quo.239 To take one example, the beverage industry has spent enormous
sums that have succeeded in derailing soda tax efforts in many areas.240
Tribes may, in contrast, be too small or too far below media radar to
attract similar lobbying campaigns; further, the long tradition of robust
citizen participation in many tribal governments241 may create a
countervailing force to lobbying efforts not present in the state or local
context.
Finally, tribes have greater freedom to experiment in certain areas
because, while they are bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act, which
statutorily requires tribes to recognize most U.S. constitutional rights,
they are not bound by the Constitution itself. This gives tribes additional
freedom to regulate, not only in the areas in which the Indian Civil
Rights Act (“ICRA”) does not mirror the Constitution (such as gun
regulation),242 but also, to a lesser extent, in the situations in which
ICRA does directly incorporate the language of the Bill of Rights,
because tribes have some latitude to develop their own interpretations of
ICRA that may not precisely map nontribal courts’ views of equivalent

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See Valencia-Weber, supra note 21, at 256–57.
See Singel, supra note 24, at 842–43.
See id. at 838, 855.
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 53.
See Premack, supra note 124.
See Singel, supra note 24, at 835.
See Riley, supra note 28, at 1715.
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rights outside the tribal context.243 Arguably, this makes for a desirable
balance: while tribes must pay heed to core constitutional rights, they
have some space to interpret them more flexibly and in more culturespecific ways, allowing them to test a greater variety of policies and
ideas.
Of course, one could take the contrary position as well. In some cases,
tribes have adopted policies that are at odds with Supreme Court
precedent and the values of many U.S. citizens; not all tribes recognize
same-sex marriages, for example.244 Tribal policies that depart too far
from generally accepted U.S. norms may not only make borrowing
impossible, but create more skepticism in the non-Indian community
about the value of distinctive tribal regulation more generally.
Nonetheless, in other areas, tribal regulation can depart from mainstream
federal or state policy while causing less controversy. A notable area
where this might be possible is firearms, where commentators have
urged greater use of tribal laboratories’ potential.245 Since tribes are not
bound by the Second Amendment, such experimentation would have no
effect on the contested issue of the scope of the constitutional right to
bear arms.246 At the same time, the ability to assess the experience of
tribes that regulate guns more strictly than the Second Amendment
might allow would be a valuable contribution to the national debate, and
one that both advocates and foes of more extensive gun regulation might
find useful.
2. Tribal Models and Wider Applicability
The fact of widespread tribal innovation offers the potential for a
productive interchange of influence between tribal models and those of
state and local governments. Tribes inhabit territory side by side with

243. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 344 n.238 (1998) (noting that several tribal courts have found
that ICRA does not require them to follow the U.S. Supreme Court “jot for jot”).
244. See Steve Russell, The Headlines Are Wrong! Same-Sex Marriage Not Banned Across
Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 23, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/2015/04/23/headlines-are-wrong-same-sex-marriage-not-banned-across-indiancountry-160091 [https://perma.cc/S6KZ-6C7B] (noting that, while tribes are increasingly
recognizing same-sex marriage, not all tribes have done so).
245. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1729 (“Thinking of Indian nations as self-selected laboratories
for gun laws presents unique and uncharted opportunities for tribes.”).
246. Ann Tweedy, however, has suggested that federal courts might be more skeptical of tribal
regulation that departs substantially from the Second Amendment. See Tweedy, supra note 171, at
902 (noting possibility that “a federal appellate court or the Supreme Court could be alarmed by a
tribe’s ability to make law that contradicts the current interpretation of the Second Amendment”).
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nontribal governments in the United States and confront many of the
same issues. For example, the problems of diabetes, obesity, and lack of
access to fresh food that motivated the Navajo Nation’s junk food tax are
ubiquitous in nontribal communities throughout the United States.247
The idea that tribes may contribute ideas and models to other
jurisdictions within the United States is in keeping with a wider view of
federalism—one that looks beyond states and even municipalities for
broader models of governance. Michael W. McConnell has argued that
local governments are particularly likely to “depart from established
consensus” and thus produce greater innovation.248 More recently,
Heather Gerken has advocated for “federalism all the way down”—a
greater attention to how local institutions (including not just cities but
“juries, school committees, zoning boards, local prosecutors’ offices,
state administrative agencies”) govern and interact with each other.249 As
she notes, the actions of such institutions may “catalyze national debate”
or enhance our understanding of how governmental processes work.250
Further, because of their diversity, such institutions may provide
minorities excluded from states and national governments the chance to
exercise power.251
Similar arguments apply to the tribal context. Like local institutions,
tribes can provide alternative models of governance and offer a forum
for interests and coalitions that have little influence at the national level.
At the same time, because tribes possess elements of sovereignty that
local governments do not, the examples they offer may be more directly
transferable to states. Wenona Singel argues that tribes’ “diligent,
persistent work of governance . . . generate[s] benefits that extend well
beyond tribal communities.”252 Tribes have a long tradition both of local
autonomy and responsiveness253 and of the ability to govern effectively

247. For a description of how these problems manifest themselves in nontribal, high-poverty
households and communities, see, e.g., Adam Drewnowski & S.E. Specter, Poverty and Obesity:
The Role of Energy Density and Energy Costs, 79 AM. J. OF CLINICAL NUTRITION 6–16 (2004).
248. See McConnell, supra note 111, at 1498.
249. See Heather Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21–22
(2010) (arguing for a “broad-gauged, democratic account of how these nested governmental
structures ought to interact”).
250. See id. at 24.
251. See id. at 27.
252. See Singel, supra note 24, at 830.
253. See id. at 840–41 (“Tribal governance and response to social problems has allowed Native
leaders to apply their knowledge of local context to produce policies that are often more successful
than centralized management under federal control.”).
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under challenging conditions.254 Moreover, as Singel notes, tribes in
some circumstances face particularly high exposure to problems such as
climate change, giving them an incentive to develop cutting-edge
solutions that other governments can adopt.255
It is worth noting, however, that at least one commentator has
expressed skepticism about the relevance of tribal models, at least in
some areas, to nontribal governments. Carole L. Goldberg has argued
that tribal restorative justice models, for example, are difficult to transfer
to the nontribal context. While recognizing that interest in tribal
peacemaking processes represents “romantic yearnings for a different
way of life”—one that is “less adversarial and more effective in
resolving conflict”—Goldberg argues that tribal peacemaking practices
are simply too deeply rooted in distinctive tribal attributes, including
attitudes toward religion and kinship, to lend themselves to borrowing
by other communities.256 As a result, Goldberg finds the prospect of
importation to be “treacherous at best, and altogether futile at worst,”
and urges proponents of more cooperative dispute resolution to find
solutions within non-tribal culture.257
Goldberg’s arguments have some force; in some cases, the very
aspects of tribal governments that make them more likely to try
innovative policies, such as cultural distinctiveness and responsiveness
to local concerns, may also reflect real differences that make it difficult
for states to easily transpose the models they provide. At the same time,
even in an area such as restorative justice that is replete with challenges
for cross-cultural translation, some tribal institutions and practices
appear to have had a productive influence on states.258 Further, other
areas of regulation, such as marijuana legalization or incentive systems
for food purchases, may reflect needs and values less inherently specific
to the tribal context and thus more easily transposed to states.

254. See LAURA E. EVANS, POWER FROM POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS,
INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 201–02 (2011); Singel, supra note 24, at
830–31.
255. See Singel, supra note 24, at 841.
256. See Goldberg, supra note 195, at 1005.
257. See id.
258. See Susan J. Butterwick et al., Tribal Court Peacemaking: A Model for the Michigan State
Court System?, 94 MICH. BAR J. 34 (June 2015) (describing positive experiences of Washtenaw
Country Peacemaking Court, a nontribal court in Michigan modeled on tribal court peacemaking
principles); Singel, supra note 24, at 840 (“Several non-Indian jurisdictions have already adapted
Indian peacemaking and related principles of restorative justice with remarkable success.”); Wolf,
supra note 200, at 11 (“Programs based on peacemaking and similar Native American justice
practices have already been developed in a number of U.S. jurisdictions.”).
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B. Potential Negative Aspects of Tribal-State Interaction
Tribal innovation thus holds promise as a way of testing innovations
that may ultimately be adopted outside of Indian country. Yet two
negative types of state-tribal interaction are also possible. First, states
may resist tribal policies that differ from state law. If tribes lack full
autonomy to govern themselves, they may be limited in their ability to
depart from surrounding state policies, thus inhibiting their ability to test
new ideas. Second, tribal policies may have unwanted effects outside of
Indian country that can be difficult to address without tribal-state
cooperation. These two problems can interact: fear of spillovers can
cause states to seek more control over tribal policies, thus restricting
tribes’ freedom to experiment.
1. State-Imposed Obstacles to Tribal Experimentation
Tribal experimentation may be hindered by the policies of the
surrounding state in a few different ways. Sometimes these situations
resemble “race to the bottom” and spillover problems that are familiar
from the state context. For example, the Squaxin and Suquamish Tribes,
located within Washington State, appear to have been influenced by
state marijuana legalization efforts in formulating tribal marijuana
policies.259 The underlying dynamic of such influence is clear: tribes that
do not want to lose business opportunities may feel pressure to change
their law to be at least as liberal as that of the surrounding state. While
the fragile state of some tribes’ finances may make such pressures
particularly acute, they do not differ greatly in kind from similar forces
at work in the state context, such as those, for example, that drove the
relaxation of state interest rate restrictions.260
In other circumstances, the policies of surrounding states have
disproportionate influence on tribes because of problems unique to
Indian country. All jurisdictions within the United States that wish to
regulate guns, for example, must confront the problem of firearms that
are transported into the area from jurisdictions with more lax policies.
Yet while tribes in theory have more power to regulate guns than do
states, they face an issue states do not: not only can tribes not stop guns
from being brought onto reservations, they lack meaningful ability to
enforce their regulations against nonmembers living on or visiting the

259. See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
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reservation.261 With respect to guns, it is particularly apparent why tribes
might not want to take away or restrict ownership rights from their own
members while leaving them vulnerable to nonmembers over whom the
tribe has no power. Even where there is no such obvious safety issue,
however, tribes may be reluctant to impose burdens on their members
that nonmember residents of the reservation can avoid. Further, to the
extent that a regulation requires fairly uniform compliance to be
effective, tribal laws that apply to only a fraction of the population may
simply be of little value.
In some cases, then, circumstances may make it difficult or
unappealing for tribes to depart substantially from state law. In addition,
states may dislike the regulatory choices tribes make and may act in
ways that undermine tribal autonomy. One readily available case study
for this process is the effect of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) on state law. IGRA, which the next section will explore in
greater depth, directly pegs tribal law to state law by using state law to
define the types of games over which states must negotiate.262 Notably,
this linkage, when first enacted, represented a new statutory limitation
on tribal power because prior to IGRA, tribes were free to allow
whatever games they chose so long as they conformed to federal law.263
In some cases, states have allowed tribes to pursue a gaming policy
radically different from the one that prevails in the surrounding state;
Kevin Washburn has observed that, in many states, tribal casinos are
“islands of gaming permissiveness in an ocean of gaming
intolerance.”264 He attributes this phenomenon to an unlikely
collaboration between legislators influenced by pro-tribal interests and
those who are simply committed to limiting gaming as much as possible
(and thus do not want it to spread outside reservations).265
261. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
262. With respect to Class II games such as bingo and pulltabs, states must negotiate as to all
games if any are permissible to any degree under state law. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)–(8), 2710(d)
(2012). With respect to lucrative Class III games, such as blackjack and roulette, the Second Circuit
takes a similar position (if the state allows any for any purpose, it must negotiate with respect to all),
but the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a more restrictive one, holding that states must
negotiate only with respect to the particular games they allow. Compare Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d. Cir. 1990) (adopting broader view of Class III gaming), with
Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994) (taking more restrictive position),
and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
263. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 12.02, at 881 (“Before IGRA was enacted, states
played a very limited role in Indian gaming.”).
264. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 285,
294 (2003).
265. See id. at 295.
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In other cases, however, hostility to tribal gaming can result in
changes in state law intended to limit tribes’ freedom to set their own
gaming policy. In Wisconsin, for example, after a federal court
interpreted Wisconsin law as permitting casino-style games (thus
requiring such games to be on the table in compact negotiations),266
voters amended the state constitution in 1993 to include an express ban
on casino-style games.267 Although then-Governor Tommy Thompson
did not immediately attempt to halt tribal casino gaming, the amendment
was recognized as giving him the power to “issue the death penalty” for
such gaming if he so chose,268 and the deal he ultimately brokered with
Wisconsin tribes exacted large concessions in return for their ability to
continue offering casino games.269 The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
however, subsequently held that the governor lacked the power to
negotiate with respect to games barred under Wisconsin law,270 although
it later clarified that compacts negotiated pre-amendment must remain in
effect.271 Nonetheless, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to
decide whether compacts to which changes were negotiated post-2003
remained valid,272 these decisions continue to create legal uncertainty for
tribes.
States have also used the IGRA compact process as a means of
forcing changes in tribal policy that often appear to go well beyond
IGRA’s originally envisioned reach.273 For example, as a condition of
allowing certain tribes to be the exclusive venues within the state for
casino gaming, California required the tribes to share revenue with nongaming tribes, make payments to a state fund to offset gaming-related
costs, and adopt a tribally approved labor ordinance.274 Although the
Ninth Circuit found these provisions to be consistent with IGRA’s

266. See Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp.
480, 483 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
267. See Kathryn R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State
Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 991 (2007).
268. See id. at 992.
269. See id. at 993.
270. Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004), abrogated by Dairyland Greyhound Park,
Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006); see also Rand, supra note 267, at 995–98.
271. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, 719 N.W.2d 408.
272. See id. at 438 n.61 (“We do not reach the 2003 gaming compacts.”); Rand, supra note 267,
at 999 (“[T]he Dairyland court claimed not to reach the 2003 amendments, seemingly construing
them as separate compacts rather than amendments to the original compacts.”).
273. See Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States as Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal Relationship:
A Historical Critique of Tribal-State Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 185, 208 (2010).
274. See id. at 207.
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proper scope,275 they represent to some extent a substitution of
California’s policies for tribally determined ones.
Attitudes toward gaming vary, of course, and some courts have seen
such state measures as reasonable attempts to control the off-reservation
effects of gaming.276 Nonetheless, they also serve as checks on robust
tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Although the effects of
gaming “[c]learly . . . may go beyond the casino floor,”277 and it is
reasonable for states to be cognizant of that fact, heavy state
involvement that limits the independence of tribal decision-making also
hinders tribes’ ability to test regulatory schemes that differ from state
law.
2. Tribal Policies and Spillover Effects
Of course, just as state policies can have unwanted effects on tribes or
on surrounding states, tribal policies may themselves have spillovers in
surrounding communities. Some of these effects are unavoidable and
may be fairly easily resolved. If a tribal casino creates added traffic on a
state road, the state and the tribe can agree in compact negotiations that
the tribe will help fund the road’s expansion.278 Such negotiations
happen frequently outside the formal IGRA compact process as well, as
when tribes enter into intergovernmental agreements with state and local
governments on matters ranging from law enforcement to land use.279
Where meaningful differences exist in state and tribal policies,
however, such agreement can be more difficult to achieve. For example,
South Dakota officials expressed hostility to the Flandreau Sandee Sioux
Tribe’s marijuana resort plans based in part on fears that state residents
would ingest marijuana on the reservation and then return to state
territory, where marijuana was illegal.280 Likewise, the issue of payday
lending, which this Article has already discussed as an example of a
pernicious race to the bottom in the state context, has recently been a

275. In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003).
276. See id. at 1114–15 (noting that compact providing for some revenue-sharing with state
required that the money be spent on purposes “directly related to tribal gaming” and finding that this
is “not . . . inimical to the purpose or design of IGRA”).
277. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 208.
278. See id.
279. See Singel, supra note 24, at 842–43 (“Intergovernmental agreements between tribes and
other tribal, local, state, and federal governments exist in nearly every area of governance, including
environmental protection, natural resources management, law enforcement, criminal justice, child
welfare, taxation, and land use planning.”).
280. See Manning, supra note 15.
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source of friction between some states and tribes. Operating in an area
where state laws range from “draconian . . . to permissive,” payday
lenders have already successfully evaded state law by taking their
operations online. 281 As some states have grown more aggressive about
enforcing their laws, some payday lenders have also partnered with
tribes to create so-called tribal lending entities (TLEs) that make
nationwide online loans.282 Because tribal business entities generally
share in tribal sovereign immunity, such lenders may escape state-court
suit and consequent discovery.283 Notably, the high-interest payday loan
business is often of limited financial value to tribes, which sometimes
receive as little as one percent of revenue.284
Tribes’ payday lending partnerships have been subject to criticism
and calls for greater tribal or federal regulation.285 Meanwhile, some
tribes have defended payday loans as the provision of a needed service
to underbanked consumers286 and a reasonable expression of tribal
sovereignty that is no different in kind from the “sort of economic
engineering” engaged in states like Delaware and South Dakota, “which
routinely export their corporate-favorable state laws” to consumers in
more restrictive jurisdictions.287
In the midst of the controversy, some tribes have worked to improve
internal regulation of their own lending practices and to defuse tensions
with state and federal officials. In March 2016, the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe
281. See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes:
Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751,
764–65 (2012).
282. Hilary B. Miller, The Future of Tribal Lending Under the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, ABA BUS. L. SECTION (Mar. 22, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
blt/content/2013/03/article-04-miller.shtml [https://perma.cc/RP35-CAXX]; Ben Walsch, Outlawed
by the States, Payday Lenders Take Refuge on Reservations, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/29/online-payday-lenders-reservations_n_7625006.html
[https://perma.cc/TJ4T-NTCF].
283. See Miller, supra note 282.
284. See Martin & Schwartz, supra note 281, at 767 (noting that under some payday lending
models, “tribes get the crumbs while the non-tribal outsiders use their tribal sovereignty to make
huge profits”); Julia Harte and Joanna Zuckerman Bernstein, Payday Nation: When Tribes Team Up
With Payday Lenders, Who Profits?, AL JAZEERA AM. (June 17, 2014),
http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/payday-nation/ [https://perma.cc/MQ3V-V6NS].
285. See Martin & Schwartz, supra note 281; Rosen, Pluralism, infra note 306, at 786.
286. See Robert Rosette & Saba Bazzazieh, Arizona’s Win-Win Short-Term Credit Solution:
Assisting Arizona’s Unbanked and Underbanked While Supporting Tribal Self-Determination, 45
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 781 (2013).
287. See Jennifer H. Weddle, Nothing Nefarious: The Federal Legal and Historical Predicate for
Tribal Sovereign Lending, 61 FED. LAWYER 58, 62 (Apr. 2014), https://www.bestlawyers.com/
Downloads/Articles/4218_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KWM-254R].
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of Louisiana announced its plans to create a Tribal Regulatory
Commission for Consumer Lending.288 The Commission, whose
inaugural members include a former mayor of Phoenix, Arizona and a
former head of the National Indian Gaming Commission,289 is intended
to influence not only the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe but the tribal lending
industry more generally, as part of what the tribal chairman called a way
“to challenge ourselves to create a better lending product and change the
tribal online lending industry in a meaningful way.”290 The Commission,
which was initiated by the tribe but operates independently, is designed
to facilitate better communication with federal regulators; it has received
“largely positive feedback” from tribal leaders.291
Short-term, high-interest loans are likely to remain a controversial
lending product that may continue to cause friction between tribes that
offer them and states with more restrictive regulations. At the same time,
efforts at tribal self-regulation and to negotiate accommodations between
states and tribes may help to ease tensions. As the issue of payday
lending shows, spillovers between states and tribes are not necessarily of
a different kind than those that occur between states, but mutual trust
and cooperation may be more difficult to achieve than in the interstate
context.
3. The Legal Uncertainty Underlying State-Tribal Spillovers
Further, although states create spillover effects for their neighbors that
resemble in many respects the issues that exist in the state-tribal context,
the state-tribal arena differs in one important respect from the interstate
one: states have numerous constitutional restrictions and
subconstitutional mechanisms to help them negotiate interstate conflict,
while state-tribal relationships are, by contrast, fraught with legal
uncertainty.
The interstate version of horizontal federalism relies on several
constitutional provisions that, while incomplete and uncertain in many
respects, nonetheless help to define states’ respective territorial spheres.
288. See Tunica-Biloxi Tribe Establishes a New Commission to Regulate Tribal Lending, RED
LAKE NATION NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.redlakenationnews.com/story/2016/03/24/
business/tunica-biloxi-tribe-establishes-a-new-commission-to-regulate-tribal-lending/45167.html
[https://perma.cc/XDE7-USL9].
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Andrew Westney, New Tribal Panel to Offer Input on CFPB Regulation, LAW360 (Apr. 22,
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/787472/new-tribal-panel-to-offer-input-on-cfpb-regulation
[https://perma.cc/D7Q5-GHDZ].
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Most relevant for comparison to the tribal context, states are subject to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause292 and statute,293 and their ability to pass
regulations (and, in some cases, issue court opinions) with
extraterritorial effects is limited by a number of constitutional doctrines,
including dormant Commerce Clause limits on extraterritorial
regulation,294 Due Process Clause limits on punitive damages for
conduct in other states,295 and restrictions (under both the Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses) on the degree to which states can
apply forum law to out-of-state conduct.296 While the precise contours of
these doctrines are notoriously unclear,297 it is fair to say that they
impose both a number of specific prohibitions on states—for example,
state courts may not impose punitive damages for out-of-state conduct
lawful in the jurisdiction where it took place298—and, in the aggregate,
help to foster a sense that territorial overreaching is undesirable.
By contrast, the Constitution has nothing to say about the territorial
element of tribal power, and Supreme Court case law has left the area
severely underexplored. A major issue—though by no means the sole
one—is that, because of several relatively recent Supreme Court cases,
tribes do not possess the automatic territorial jurisdiction that states do;
they often lack the power to tax, regulate, or hale into court nonmembers
present in their territory, and where they do have such power, it is
difficult to establish ex ante because the underlying law is murky and
fact-specific.299 Perhaps an even more severe problem is that the
Supreme Court only sporadically conceives of tribes as territorial
sovereigns in the first place; rather, it has tended to view tribal
sovereignty, particularly when it comes to regulation, as either the power

292. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
293. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
294. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–37 (1989).
295. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
296. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985).
297. See Florey, supra note 109, at 1134 (noting that extraterritoriality limits are a “famously
murky and unsettled area of law”).
298. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572–73 (“[A s]tate may not impose economic sanctions on violators
of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”).
299. See Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101
CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1554–55 (2013) (discussing uncertain, fact-specific nature of the Court’s
jurisprudence on tribal jurisdiction).
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of a landowner over land300 or that of a voluntary organization over its
members.301
The degree to which state authority can encroach on tribal land is also
a muddled question. The Indian Commerce Clause, plenary power
doctrine, and federal trust relationship with tribes suggest that states are
mostly excluded from the federal-tribal relationship except where
Congress so authorizes,302 and foundational cases such as Worcester v.
Georgia stand for the proposition that state law has no place in Indian
country.303 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that states
have power to extend their law onto reservations in various ways—from
punishing crimes nonmembers commit against each other in Indian
country304 to compelling tribes themselves to help enforce state taxes.305
Even as the Court has recognized these state powers, however, their
contours are quite unclear. This muddled conception of tribal
territoriality and state-tribal boundaries is a recipe for uncertainty and
conflict when states and tribes follow divergent policies that have effects
on each other’s land.
A second extraterritoriality problem has to do with the Court’s focus
on tribal membership as a basis for tribal power. This membership-based
analysis raises the question whether tribes have power over their
members while they are off tribal territory and the related issue of the
power that states possess to regulate their nonmember citizens when they
are on it. In the interstate context, many questions exist about the degree
to which states can (if at all) restrain their citizens from traveling to
other states to engage in conduct that would be illegal in their home
state.306 This question, a perennial topic of debate307 that remains
300. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (noting that “a
hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands”).
301. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (characterizing tribal sovereignty as “but
a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal
members”).
302. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 186–87 (describing primacy of federal-tribal
relationship).
303. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (finding that “the laws of
Georgia can have no force” in Cherokee territory).
304. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
305. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151
(1980) (finding that “the State may impose at least ‘minimal’ burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in
enforcing and collecting the [state cigarette] tax”).
306. For an overview of this longstanding debate, see Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The
Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973 (2002) (taking the view
that citizens of one state may travel to another to engage in conduct that is legal there, but illegal in
their home state); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to
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unresolved, is both more urgent and more complicated in the tribal
arena. On the one hand, the contours of tribal and state jurisdiction in
Indian country have, in contrast to the interstate context, always been
based on citizenship rather than territory. From that perspective, it seems
natural that states and tribes alike should be able to apply their law to,
respectively, nonmembers and members, regardless of whether the
conduct at issue took place in or out of Indian country. Further, some of
the constitutional provisions that have been cited as potential restraints
on states’ ability to regulate their citizens’ conduct, such as the
Privileges and Immunities clauses from both Article IV and the
Fourteenth Amendment,308 do not apply to tribes directly.309
In some ways, then, it seems more likely that extraterritorial
regulation of citizens/members would be permissible across reservation
borders. But there is also law to the contrary, and it should be noted that
tribal regulation of nonmembers off-reservation and state regulation of
citizens on-reservation are, despite some similarities, different issues in
many respects. With respect to states, federal Indian law doctrine
appears to assume that they will have some ability to regulate their
members while in Indian country (at least as long as they remain within
state borders). Even though state law generally does not apply on
reservations (except to the extent the state may have opted into criminal
jurisdiction under Public Law 280), states have had jurisdiction since the
nineteenth century over crimes committed by nonmembers against
nonmember victims in Indian country.310 In the civil context, it is clear
that states can often (although not invariably) tax transactions involving
nonmembers in Indian country, even where those transactions are with
the tribe or its members;311 further, states can compel tribes to bear some
of the record-keeping burden of administering such taxes by, for

Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992);
Rosen, supra note 89, at 864–64 (taking the opposite view); Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft”
Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial
Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713 (2007) [hereinafter Pluralism] (expanding upon the author’s prior
views).
307. See supra note 306.
308. See Rosen, Pluralism, supra note 306, at 731–32.
309. While these provisions do not apply directly to tribes, they might come into play if, for
example, the citizen of one state wanted to travel to a tribe located in a different state to engage in
conduct illegal in her home state.
310. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). This jurisdiction may also extend to
victimless nonmember crimes. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 9.03[1], at 763–64.
311. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 141–
42 (1980).
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example, keeping a log of cigarette purchasers and turning it over to the
state upon request.312 This jurisdictional landscape suggests a continued
regulatory oversight by states over nonmember citizens when they are on
a reservation.
This background does not, however, necessarily mean that state
authority over nonmembers on reservations is unlimited. State law and
taxes emphatically do not apply to a great deal of nonmembers’ Indian
country conduct or transactions.313 Also left unanswered are the
questions that arise when a citizen of one state travels to a reservation in
a different state: is this simply an instance of the problem of
extraterritorial regulation of citizens discussed above, or do distinct
factors present in the tribal context counsel a different result?
The question whether tribes can regulate their members’ conduct
outside of Indian country raises different but similarly vexing questions.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has in recent years tended to
conceive of tribal authority in quasi-contractual terms, suggesting that
the act of becoming a tribe member represents agreement to accept tribal
regulation.314 This view would seem to permit tribes to include
regulation of off-reservation conduct as part of the bargain of
membership; the Supreme Court has lent support to this view by noting
that tribes “possess[] attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory.”315 Tribal courts, for example, may have jurisdiction
over matters involving domestic relations regardless of where members
reside and may be able to determine ownership of property outside of
Indian country.316 On the other hand, although the Court has not fully
delineated the extent of the power tribes possess over their members, it
is likely not unlimited; the leading Indian law treatise suggests that tribes
would have a strong case for extraterritorial regulation only with respect
to such “core tribal interests” as domestic relations, probate, maintaining

312. See id. at 151.
313. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 761–62 (1985) (finding that
state of Montana could not tax royalty interests in oil and gas produced pursuant to leases between
tribe and nonmember lessees); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338 (1983)
(rejecting application of state hunting and fishing regulation to nonmembers on reservation);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (finding that Arizona could not exercise jurisdiction over
a suit involving on-reservation transactions between members of the Navajo tribe and a non-Indian
general store operator).
314. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
315. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (emphasis added); see also COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 4.01[2][d], at 220 (2012) (discussing significance of this language).
316. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25,
§ 7.02[1][c], at 603.
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the peace, and hunting or fishing regulation.317 It is far from clear
whether tribes could regulate their members with respect to, say, the offreservation use of marijuana.
Even if one accepts some ability by states and tribes to regulate the
extraterritorial conduct of their citizens or members, the practical
difficulties of implementation and enforcement attending such regulation
are immense. Because of states’ and tribes’ respective jurisdictional
gaps, in many cases the only means by which each sovereign could
enforce its respective laws would be to work out a cross-jurisdictional
enforcement agreement. Further, because applicability of each
sovereign’s law would depend on tribal membership status, enforcement
would be complicated and in many cases impossible. On the one hand, a
tribe selling marijuana to nonmembers could require them to present
driver’s licenses and sell only to those nonmembers residing in states in
which such a sale would be legal. But if a tribe wanted to bar its
members from off-reservation purchases of marijuana, the state would
have no practical way of verifying that a potential purchaser was not a
member of the tribe in question. Given such difficulties, cross-border
enforcement might not be possible even if both tribe and state were
willing parties.
As a result of these issues, the question of jurisdictional and territorial
boundaries when state and tribes have different policies is fraught with
uncertainty that is not present in the interstate context. Moreover, many
of the doctrines that mediate potential interstate tensions simply do not
exist where tribal-state relationships are concerned. The final section of
this Article considers how existing law might be changed to facilitate
positive interaction between tribes and states—respect for each other’s
distinctive policy choices, and borrowing of successful innovations—
and to minimize friction.
IV. MAXIMIZING THE PROMISE OF TRIBAL INNOVATION
Tribes offer great promise as regulatory pioneers, but the extent to
which they can fulfill that promise depends on background policies. This
section suggests two changes to current law that could enhance tribes’
ability to engage in experimentation: policies favoring more robust tribal
autonomy, and development in the tribal-state context of doctrines
similar to those promoting comity and positive interaction that exist in
the sister-state realm. More tentatively, it considers the advantages and

317. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 4.01[2][d].
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disadvantages of a federal framework to promote what Alex Wellchief
Skibine has called “cooperative tri-federalism”318 in which states, tribes,
and the federal government all participate.
A. Strengthening Tribal Powers
A recognition of the role that tribes play in developing innovative
policies should counsel in favor of granting tribes powers that are both
stronger and more clearly delineated. Currently, tribal powers over
nonmembers—even those who deliberately and voluntarily associate
themselves with a tribe or a reservation—are severely limited. This
situation is largely the product of Montana v. United States,319 a 1981
case invalidating a Crow Tribe ordinance barring nonmembers from
hunting or fishing within the reservation.320 In reaching Montana’s
result, the Court found that tribes lacked the ability to regulate
nonmember conduct within reservations on land not owned by the tribe
unless one of two exceptions were met: the conduct is rooted in a
“consensual relationship[] with the tribe or its members[] through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements”321 or it
“threatens or has some direct effect” upon the tribe’s “political
integrity . . . economic security, or . . . health or welfare.”322 Three years
prior to Montana, the Court had already found that tribes lacked criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.323
Montana and later cases that build on it have been sharply criticized
by scholars on many grounds—among others, for narrowing tribal
sovereignty,324 for ignoring the troublesome nonmember conduct that led
to the Crow Tribe’s action,325 and for inserting judicially crafted law into
318. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
253, 259 (2010).
319. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
320. Id. at 547.
321. Id. at 565.
322. Id. at 566.
323. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In general, it remains the case
that tribes lack such jurisdiction, although under the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act, tribes that conform to certain requirements have a limited ability to prosecute nonIndians for certain types of intimate partner violence. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
324. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 80–81 (criticizing judicial trend embodied in Montana, among
other cases, toward limiting tribal sovereignty).
325. See John P. LaVelle, Beating a Path of Retreat from Treaty Rights and Tribal Sovereignty:
The Story of Montana v. United States, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 539–41 (2011) (discussing evidence
that Crow Tribe had passed its regulation in response to problem of nonmember tourists traveling to
reservation to hunt and fish).
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an area that had been traditionally the province of Congress.326 But in
addition to these important criticisms, another line of objection to
Montana is that it is simply shortsighted, ignoring the benefits to other
tribes and to states that could accrue through facilitating robust tribal
self-governance.
As the law stands, Montana poses several distinct problems for the
model of tribes as laboratories. First and most basically, it shrinks tribes’
sovereign powers and sharply limits their ability to exercise a basic level
of control over their territory. Indeed, much nonmember conduct in
Indian country falls into a legal gray area, not clearly subject to
regulation either by the tribe or the state, with the result that Matthew
L.M. Fletcher has described nonmember activity on reservations as
“some of the least governed activity in the United States.”327
Second, Montana creates uncertainty that is in direct tension with a
stable regulatory climate. Because the scope of Montana’s exceptions is
unclear, it is almost impossible for a tribe to know in advance whether it
is within its power to apply a given regulation to nonmembers or not. In
the case of gun regulation, for example, tribes may be able to regulate
nonmembers pursuant to Montana’s “health and welfare” exception.328
Yet two scholars who have addressed the issue at length have taken
starkly different positions on whether a court is likely to find that these
regulations fit within the exception,329 and no court appears to have yet
considered the matter. Further, where courts have pronounced on the
validity of particular tribal regulations under Montana,330 the Montana
326. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 14, at 48–49 (arguing that, with Oliphant and Montana, the
Court abandoned its traditional approach of deferring to Congress and began crafting common law
to protect perceived nonmember interests).
327. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 973, 1002 (2010).
328. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
329. See Riley, supra note 28, at 1739 (suggesting that tribal gun regulation is likely to fall within
Montana’s health and welfare exception); Tweedy, supra note 171, at 897–98 (opining that “it is
impossible to predict” whether a given tribal gun regulation would survive a Montana challenge and
suggesting that some such regulations might not, given the “unduly parsimonious way” in which the
Court has interpreted the Montana exceptions).
330. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (finding that Montana
barred tribal imposition of hotel tax on nonmember hotel on private land); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 440–45 (1989) (upholding some tribal
zoning regulations under Montana exceptions while invalidating others); Evans v. ShoshoneBannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1307 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that, under
Montana, tribe could not prohibit nonmember from constructing single-family house on fee simple
land within reservation borders); State of Mont. Dept. of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding that tribe lacked regulatory authority under Montana to enforce Tribal
Employment Rights Ordinance against state engaged in maintenance work on state highway).
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inquiry’s fact-specific nature makes it difficult for other tribes to
generalize from those decisions. Even when tribes take the cautious
course of passing regulations applicable only to members, enforcement
may be fraught with doubt because it may not be obvious at a glance
whether someone (who may be of tribal ancestry and/or a lifelong
resident on the reservation) is a member of the tribe or not.
The need to make such determinations, and to engage in the sort of
litigation that may well attend the tribe’s efforts to assert its sovereignty,
makes regulation far costlier and more difficult for tribes than for
states.331 These problems may be particularly acute in the case of new or
bold regulations that may represent more of a departure from existing
expectations and thus are more likely to encounter resistance. Thus,
tribes’ inability to regulate universally may make them reluctant to
regulate at all, for fear of either having the regulations invalidated or of
simply imposing extra burdens (or, as with the case of guns, even
dangers) on their members that nonmembers who live in or pass through
tribal territory do not face.
A less obvious problem that Montana poses for tribal innovation is
that it deprives tribes of relatively pristine “laboratories” in which to
conduct their regulatory experiments. If a tribe cannot enforce its
regulations fairly uniformly throughout a particular community—and
even worse, if some members of that community are subject to different
or even conflicting legal standards, as nonmembers may be—it is much
more difficult to test the regulations’ effectiveness. Where regulation
fails to achieve its intended result, it will be difficult to sort out whether
the failure is due to inherent flaws in the idea or the absence of uniform
applicability or enforcement.
The Court’s Montana jurisprudence, and its application of the
Montana exceptions, has sometimes appeared to resemble a multifactor
balancing test, in which the Court weighs fairness to nonmembers, tribal
needs, whether states or tribes have historically exercised jurisdiction in
a certain area, and so forth. A modest way in which the Court’s position
might be moved forward is to take into account in Montana analysis the
potential benefits of regulatory experimentation, not only for the tribe in
question but for other tribes and states.

331. The phenomenon that legal uncertainty is a hindrance to effective governance and economic
development in Indian country has been widely noted. See, e.g., Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, Peter
Grajzl & A. Joseph Guse, Jurisdiction, Crime, and Development: The Impact of Public Law 280 in
Indian Country, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 127, 127 (2014) (finding Public Law 280, based on empirical
research, to be an example of the way in which “perplexing laws and unpredictable law enforcement
hinder progress” in Indian country).
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Because tribal advocates and scholars have been criticizing Montana
for decades to little avail, there is ample reason for skepticism that the
Supreme Court will take up this suggestion. Nevertheless, while the
Court has for many years shown little inclination to revisit Montana or
expand its exceptions, recent events suggest the possibility of some
positive movement. Increasingly, lower courts have been interpreting the
Montana standard in a way more generous to tribes. In Water Wheel
Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance,332 the Ninth Circuit held that
Montana applied only on land privately owned by nonmembers and did
not limit tribal power on tribal land; while this position is well supported
by the language the Court originally used in Montana, it had been
eroded by subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements.333 Water Wheel’s
result is important not merely because it restores power to tribes but
because it provides a relatively clear, territorially delineated rule that is
relatively easy to apply in most cases. Likewise, in Dolgencorp, Inc. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,334 the Fifth Circuit, while failing
to go as far as the Ninth, nonetheless held that a tribe could retain
jurisdiction over a case involving the tribal court’s jurisdiction over a
lawsuit by the family of a thirteen-year-old tribe member against Dollar
General, based on allegations that the boy had been molested while
working at the store. (The authority of tribal courts to hear claims
against nonmembers is, like direct tribal regulation of nonmembers,
governed by the Montana standard.)335 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit,
the court applied Montana notwithstanding the location of the alleged
conduct on tribal land.336 But the court also took a reasonably expansive
view of Montana’s “consent” exception, holding that Dollar General’s
relatively informal agreement to cooperate with the tribe on an
internship program was sufficient to subject it to tribal jurisdiction.337

332. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011).
333. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (indicating that the status of land as tribal or
nontribal was an important but not necessarily determinative factor in determining whether a tribe
had jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a non-Indian state officer). But see Daan Braveman, Tribal
Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 95 (2003) (suggesting that Hicks can be read
narrowly to apply only when defendants are state officials).
334. 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
335. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (stating that “[a]s to
nonmembers, . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction” and
explaining that the Montana framework applies to both).
336. Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 173 (noting that the alleged conduct occurred at a “Dollar General
store located on tribal lands”).
337. See id. (finding that tribe and Dollar General had a commercial relationship sufficient to
trigger first Montana exception).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument in
Dollar General while Justice Scalia was still on the Court, but in the
wake of Scalia’s death it granted a four-four per curiam affirmance of
the Fifth Circuit, leaving its decision intact.338 This affirmance, coupled
with the justices’ remarks at oral argument,339 suggests that the Court is
split both evenly and strongly on its general approach to tribal
jurisdiction. As a result, it will be some time before the new balance of
the Court on tribal jurisdiction issues becomes clear.340 Nonetheless,
there is some reason to hope that the Court might be willing to cast a
friendlier eye on tribal regulation in the future.
One reason for optimism is that Dollar General was a case involving
tribal court jurisdiction, not tribal regulation. Further, it involved a highstakes tort suit against a corporation in which the plaintiff sought
punitive damages. A reasonable speculation is that the extreme hostility
some of the four right-leaning justices showed at oral argument to the
tribe’s position341 did not arise entirely from suspicion of tribal selfgovernance per se but was derived in part from the impulse the Court
has shown in many recent decisions to protect corporate defendants from
what the Court views as unreasonable damages or excessive exposure to

338. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2159
(2016). Shortly after the Court’s decision, Indian law scholar Matthew L.M. Fletcher opined that the
case would continue to be useful for those invoking tribal jurisdiction. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Impact
of
Dollar
General
Affirmance,
TURTLE
TALK
(June
23,
2016),
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2016/06/23/impact-of-dollar-general-affirmance/#comments
[https://perma.cc/Q3H6-RYR8].
339. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496); Ed Gehres, Argument Analysis: Is Tribal
Court Civil Jurisdiction over Non-Indians Truly a Constitutional Issue, or One of Settled
Precedent?, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argumentanalysis-is-tribal-court-civil-jurisdiction-over-non-indians-truly-a-constitutional-issue-or-one-ofsettled-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/5X7V-QTZH] (noting division on Court between judges
“skeptic[al] of . . . the abilities of tribal courts” and those with more “confidence” in such abilities
and suggesting, based on oral argument, that this “looks to be a case that may be decided on a tight
vote”).
340. Justice Neil Gorsuch, before being appointed to the Supreme Court, participated in dozens of
cases in which tribal issues were at stake and frequently (although not invariably) sided with tribal
interests. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Neil Gorsuch Indian Law Record as Tenth Circuit Judge,
TURTLE TALK (Feb. 1, 2017), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-indian-lawrecord-as-tenth-circuit-judge/ [https://perma.cc/Y9ND-P9TW]. None of these cases, however,
directly confronts the question of tribal regulatory authority. See id.
341. See Gehres, supra note 339 (noting that, at oral argument, Justice Kennedy “startled many
observers by openly urging [Dollar General’s counsel] toward its broader constitutional arguments”
against tribal jurisdiction).
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litigation.342 Notably, at oral argument in the Dollar General case,
Dollar General’s counsel took the position that a tribe would have
broader authority to bring an action on its own behalf enforcing a tax or
licensing requirement than to invest its courts with jurisdiction to hear a
private suit.343
Indeed, most of the Court’s recent opinions scaling back tribal
sovereignty have focused on tribal courts rather than tribal regulation.
The Court, while cautioning that “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does
not exceed its legislative jurisdiction,”344 has specifically left open the
question whether tribal legislative jurisdiction might be the broader
power.345 In practice, in assessing the validity of tribal regulation, the
Court has sounded a more mixed note than it has in the judicial realm,
where it has tended to rule against tribal interests more consistently. On
the one hand, the Court found that a tribe lacked the authority to tax
nonmember hotel guests staying on private land within a reservation,346
and in doing so, emphatically restated and even expanded the general
Montana formulation.347 At the same time, the Court has also held,
marking the only instance in which the Court has explicitly found a
Montana exception to apply,348 that the Montana “health and welfare”
exception permitted a tribe to block nonmember development on private
land in a pristine area of the reservation,349 and it has shielded tribes

342. See Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-thissupreme-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/AC45-9MQG] (describing Court as “far friendlier to
business than . . . any court since at least World War II”).
343. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
344. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
345. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001) (describing the issue as an “open question”
and declining to resolve it).
346. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). This case is in some tension with
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 130 (1982), which held that the tribal power to tax
derived from a tribe’s “general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its
jurisdiction.”
347. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 647 (beginning opinion with discussion of Montana framework).
The Court had not previously applied Montana to tribal taxes. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 171–72.
348. An evenly divided Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, which relied on the
consensual relationships exception, but its one-sentence opinion failed to reveal the justices’
reasoning. See Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. at 2160.
349. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989). In a fractured opinion, the Court decided (with different majorities on each issue) that the
tribe could not apply its zoning regulations to private nonmember land in a more trafficked area of
the reservation, id. at 445 (opinion of Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court in part and
concurring in part), but could do so in a closed portion of the reservation that was retained a
“pristine” wilderness character. Id. at 440–41.

09 - Florey.docx (Do Not Delete)

770

5/28/2017 2:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:713

from the application of state law that might disrupt a uniform system of
tribal game management and hunting regulation.350 In the latter case,
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,351 it is particularly notable that
the Court recognized the danger of allowing inconsistent schemes of
regulation to coexist within a single geographic area: the Court noted
that “concurrent [state and tribal] jurisdiction would effectively nullify
the Tribe’s authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation”
and would disrupt the fish and game management scheme that had been
jointly developed by tribal and federal authorities.352 Even where ruling
against tribal interests, the Court has at times displayed some concern for
the territorial integrity of tribal lands.353
All this suggests that—particularly if newly confirmed Justice
Gorsuch proves favorable to tribal interests—this may be an opportune
moment for tribes to assert a robust view of their regulatory power under
Montana. In making this argument, tribes will be able to point to the
diversity and novelty of their regulatory efforts and their benefits both to
other tribes and to the nation as a whole. One of the factors thought to
have driven the Montana decision is the Court’s (mostly unfounded)
belief that the Crow Tribe’s regulation constituted an attempt to
advantage its members to the detriment of nonmembers living and
owning property on the reservation.354 By contrast, successful tribal
innovation provides a chance to highlight the positive aspects of tribal
autonomy in ways that might resonate with the Supreme Court—
especially, perhaps, with a differently constituted one.
B. Tribal-State Engagement and Comity
The relationship between states and tribes is, along almost any
dimension, more complex than the relationships between individual
states. States clearly occupy a position of parity with each other within
the constitutional structure. By contrast, the relationship of states and
tribes is both murky and fraught. On the one hand, by virtue of both
history and current doctrine, tribes are autonomous sovereigns that
negotiate with the United States on a government-to-government basis
350. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
351. Id.
352. See id. at 338.
353. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327
(“[T]ribes retain sovereign interests in activities that occur on land owned and controlled by the
tribe.” (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 3592 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment))).
354. See LaVelle, supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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and are not automatically subject to all federal law,355 unlike states,
which are bound by the Supremacy Clause to a position subordinate to
the federal government. At the same time, states enjoy more day-to-day
sovereign authority in many important respects; they possess police
powers giving them typical sovereign authority to regulate people and
conduct within their territory, whereas the ability of tribes to govern the
conduct of nonmembers on their reservations is notoriously both limited
and unclear.356
Moreover, tribes and states have a history of mutual suspicion in
which states have often been the—figurative or literal—aggressors
against tribes. Tribes’ primary relationship has been to the federal
government, not to states, and tribal sovereignty has often been defined
in opposition to state sovereignty; one of the very few ringing
affirmations of tribal autonomy to be found in U.S. case law is Justice
Marshall’s characterization of the Cherokee Nation in Worcester v.
Georgia as a “distinct community, occupying its own territory, . . . in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”357 More recently, the
adoption by many states of Public Law 280, which initially permitted
states to make the unilateral decision to apply their criminal laws in
tribal territory, further strained tribal-state relations and cast states as a
threat to tribal self-rule.358
Today, even in situations where states and tribes enjoy relatively
friendly relations, states and tribes simply do not have in place the same
sorts of doctrines and procedures that facilitate comity in the sister-state
context. Most notably, states vary in the extent to which they enforce
tribal judgments. While many states, particularly those with several
tribes within their borders, grant some degree of comity to tribal

355. The Constitution tacitly recognizes tribal sovereignty through the Indian Commerce Clause,
but does not protect it, nor does it articulate a clear role for tribes in the constitutional design. See
Singel, supra note 24, at 785–89 (summarizing historical and textual evidence about the
Constitution’s treatment of tribes). Over the years, the Court has found that Congress possesses
plenary power over tribes, and more recently it has suggested that this power is rooted in the Indian
Commerce Clause. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 186–87. But other federal Indian law
doctrines, including the so-called canons of interpretation applicable to tribes, provide at least
presumptive limits on the degree to which Congress can encroach on tribal sovereignty. See
Frickey, supra note 14, at 8–9 (describing canons).
356. See Florey, supra note 299, at 1544 (noting that “the Court’s approach creates substantial
uncertainty because—even as it displays a sweeping hostility to tribal sovereignty in general—it
mandates an examination that is stubbornly unpredictable”).
357. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832).
358. See Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., supra note 331, at 136 (noting that many tribe members
perceived P.L. 280 as a threat to tribal sovereignty that “corroded the trust between tribal citizens
and law enforcement officials and state courts”).
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judgments,359 only three currently give tribal judgments full faith and
credit.360 This is a notable contrast to the interstate context, where states
are both constitutionally361 and statutorily362 obliged to extend full faith
and credit to sister-state judgments—even if the court of the rendering
state misinterpreted the law of the enforcing state,363 adopted a position
strongly against the public policy of the enforcing state,364 or even
lacked clear subject-matter jurisdiction.365 While of course difficult to
measure directly, it would be surprising if the unquestioning deference
state courts are required to give to each other’s decisions did not play
some role in increasing both knowledge of and respect for sister-state
law and processes.366 From that perspective, the apparent trend in recent
years toward greater state enforcement of tribal judgments is promising.
Another way in which state-tribal relations differ from sister-state
ones is the degree to which the operation of choice-of-law principles
puts the courts of one state into contact with the law of other
jurisdictions. State courts constantly hear cases involving
multijurisdictional contacts in which they conclude that the law of a
different state rather than forum law should apply.367 Application of
sister-state law often involves careful study of that state’s statutes and
judicial opinions. This frequent contact can familiarize states with each

359. See Brief for the Puyallup Tribe of Indians et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 26–29, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2159
(2016) (No. 13-1496).
360. Id. at 29.
361. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
362. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
363. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 238 (1908) (holding that Mississippi must enforce a
Missouri judgment despite the fact that the rendering court incorrectly “supposed that the award [of
money in question] was binding by the law of Mississippi”).
364. See id. at 239 (White, J., dissenting) (objecting that Court was requiring enforcement by
Mississippi of a judgment “in violation of laws embodying the public policy of that state”).
365. See Des Moines Navigation & R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 558 (1887) (full
faith and credit to judgment was required even where the “record show[ed] there could be no
jurisdiction”).
366. Supporting this view, there is evidence that states’ common law is more influenced by the
law of neighboring states (which judges likely have more experience applying) than by the law of
distant states. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldiera, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State
Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 190 (1985) (noting that “the more substantial the
cultural penetration of one state by another, the more likely the recipient state court is to cite the
precedents of the original name state’s court”).
367. See Florey, supra note 92, at 1133 (observing that multijurisdictional transactions that
generate litigation are now routine).
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other’s laws and promote borrowing of ideas and doctrines from the
courts of one state to another.368
By contrast, even where the ordinary operation of state choice-of-law
principles would seem to dictate the application of tribal law, state-court
decisions applying tribal law are as rare as those applying sister-state
law are routine. State courts may simply fail to recognize the application
of tribal law as an option, or conclude that tribal law is too difficult to
ascertain or apply.369 Ironically, the reverse is not necessarily true—
many tribal courts apply doctrines modeled on state common-law
principles, or even outright adopt state law to fill in gaps in tribal
codes.370
Finally, the differences between tribes’ and states’ respective
positions in the constitutional structure make direct borrowing more
difficult in some cases. Tribes, for example, may enjoy more room to
experiment than states in environmental law areas where some federal
regulation also exists;371 at the same time, states’ unquestioned territorial
authority makes it possible for them to address problems such as drug
use or negligent driving within their borders in ways that would be
impossible for tribes that lack full powers to regulate nonmember
conduct.
For all these reasons and more, it is harder to theorize about the ways
in which tribes and states should interact in the regulatory arena than it is
in the purely interstate context. For example, Gerken and Holzblatt’s
view of spillovers sees permeability of state borders as a positive good—
something that promotes robust debate and forces both politicians and
citizens to engage unfamiliar ideas.372 But they acknowledge that this
view is somewhat in tension with the idea that the citizens of a given
state should have autonomy to “regulate themselves as they see fit.”373
The authors describe the autonomy-based view as “principled” and

368. See Caldiera, supra note 366, at 190 (suggesting that this sort of borrowing occurs).
369. See Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles Should
Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1651 (2006) (noting that some
state courts have “worried that the process of establishing the content of tribal law on a given
subject is simply too difficult” or simply failed to recognize the possibility that tribal law may
apply).
370. See id. at 1632 (noting that many tribes “rely to some degree on principles of AngloAmerican jurisprudence familiar to state courts”).
371. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 17, at 807–09 (noting that some environmental statutes
delegate federal authority to tribes and thus permit tribal regulations promulgated under the statute
preempt conflicting state law).
372. See Gerken & Holzblatt, supra note 95, at 89–90.
373. Id. at 103.
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“appealing,” while rejecting it in part on the grounds that it does not fit
descriptive reality: spillovers inevitably occur, populous states tend to
have more influence over national standards than small ones, and so
forth.374 Given these real-world factors, the authors advocate that we
balance our appreciation for the virtues of self-rule with recognition that
other, competing values more compatible with spillovers—such as
“interaction, accommodation, and compromise”—are also important.375
Gerken and Holzblatt have presented a robust defense of spillovers in
interstate interactions. Yet, even if one accepts their argument in the
interstate context, there are a number of reasons why we should be more
concerned with spillovers from states to Indian country. Where tribes are
concerned, the notion of self-rule is both more fundamental and more
fragile than it is in the state context. Indeed, the threat state
encroachment may pose to tribal governance is the central concern of the
foundational tribal sovereignty case Williams v. Lee,376 under which
certain state actions are evaluated under a test asking whether they
interfere with “the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”377 Where we may find value in a compromise
between two neighboring states with strong competing views on the
same issue, we fear state coercion in an equivalent encounter between a
tribe and a state.378 Further, to the extent the Gerken/Holzblatt defense of
spillovers centers on empirical realities, such arguments may be less
compelling in the tribal context, where reservations may be physically
remote and tribe members may have little contact with non-Indians off
the reservation, rendering frictions between competing legal regimes far
from inevitable. Of course, it is important to note that not all tribes are so
situated and that many may be important parts of an integrated regional
economy that creates many circumstances in which tribe members and
nonmembers interact both in and outside of Indian country.
In addition, a strong tradition of intertribal regulatory interaction does
not exist in the same way that the interstate one does. While tribes can
and do influence each other where regulatory policy is concerned,379

374. Id. at 103–04.
375. Id. at 104.
376. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
377. Id. at 220.
378. For example, many commentators have demonstrated how tribal concerns have often lost out
to state ones in the compact negotiating process. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 207–08;
Rand, supra note 267, at 100.
379. Many tribes, for example, have adopted peacemaking processes following the Navajo
Nation’s example. See Wolf, supra note 200.
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tribes border each other only rarely,380 and most tribes thus have
relatively limited experience with the sort of day-to-day negotiation of
frictions that states have with their neighbors. Further, while state
borders and identity may be growing less significant as citizens
participate in national markets and pass freely from state to state,381 the
same is not necessarily true in the tribal context, where membership in a
particular tribe is important not merely as a matter of personal
identification but as a factor of significance in legal doctrine.382 Thus,
while in theory it would be helpful to have a model of intertribal
interaction to draw from in thinking about tribal-state relations, a wealth
of comparable examples simply does not exist.
All this suggests that a more robust notion of tribal-state comity
would be helpful in familiarizing states with tribal law and smoothing
relations in instances where divergent tribal-state policies cause
spillovers and conflict. Obviously, it is easy to make an anodyne plea for
an improvement in tribal-state relationships but much harder to actually
bring it about. Nonetheless, it is important to look at the formal and
informal
mechanisms
that
buttress
interstate
cooperation,
experimentation, and borrowing in order to consider which might be
adaptable to the state-tribal context. As previously suggested, greater
willingness of states to grant full faith and credit to tribal decisions and
to apply tribal law when appropriate under state choice-of-law rules
would be productive steps in this direction. More basically, it may help
simply to make states (and, in some cases local governments) more
aware of the potential of tribal models—by, for example, incorporating
discussions of relevant tribal innovations into workshops for state and
local officials, or by raising media awareness of tribal regulation.
Articles discussing Philadelphia’s recent adoption of a soda tax, for
example, drew comparisons with Berkeley’s efforts but failed to mention
the precedent also provided by the Navajo Nation.383
Complicating this project, of course, is the fact that, even with the
various existing doctrines and practices that promote interstate comity,
conflicts continue to exist even in the state context. Despite any
380. See Indian Reservations in the Continental United States, NAT’L NAGPRA,
https://www.nps.gov/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/ResMAP.HTM [https://perma.cc/8PAN-YLT7] (map).
381. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1110 (2014)
(“American heterogeneity does not closely track state borders. Today, individuals from Montana to
Mississippi to Maine can eat at the same restaurant chains, shop at the same stores, read the same
publications, and listen to the same music.”).
382. See Florey, supra note 299, at 1555 (discussing “the importance the Court has placed
on . . . formal membership status” in delineating the contours of tribal jurisdiction).
383. See supra note 127.

09 - Florey.docx (Do Not Delete)

776

5/28/2017 2:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:713

deficiencies, however, states do by and large tend to get by—as Gerken
and Holzblatt have observed384—without constant friction with their
neighbors, and also seem to borrow successful experiments reasonably
often from sister states. By contrast, states vary considerably in the
degree to which they have accepted the reality of tribal sovereignty and
are willing to accommodate themselves to tribal policies that diverge
from state ones.
Marijuana legalization illustrates some of the difficulties that states
and tribes can have in negotiating contentious issues with a broad
potential for spillover effects. Notably, tribes have run into problems
when they have sought to implement policies that differ from those of
the surrounding states in both directions—both more liberal policies and
more restrictive ones. Despite what initially appeared to be the tacit
approval of the federal government, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe
was forced to abandon its plans for a marijuana resort amid hostility
from South Dakota.385 Meanwhile, the Yakama Nation has run into state
opposition in its efforts to prevent the sale of marijuana in ten
Washington counties—encompassing more than ten million acres of
land and a quarter of state territory—where its members enjoy treatyprotected hunting and fishing rights.386 Working through such problems
will require constant communication between tribal and state officials,
along with the states’ respect for tribes’ autonomous policy choices—
factors that have not always been present when state and tribal policies
diverge. It will also require a clearer delineation of the rights and
obligations of states and tribes, a process in which—as the next section
discusses—the federal government can perhaps play a role.
C. The Federal Government, the Trust Relationship, and “Cooperative
Tri-Federalism”
As the preceding sections have argued, the potential for state-tribal
friction in areas of regulatory conflict is high and the process of working
out cross-border enforcement issues may be difficult for states and tribes
to manage on their own. This situation raises the question whether
federal involvement might be desirable. Federal involvement could of
course take many forms, but in general Congress has the power both to
strengthen tribal governments by restoring inherent tribal powers over

384. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 95, at 79.
385. See Manning, supra note 15.
386. See Kaminsky, supra note 155.
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nonmembers387 and (controversially) to extend state powers in Indian
country.388 In contemplating whether federal involvement is wise and, if
so, what form it might take, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),
which establishes a framework for state-tribal negotiations over tribal
gaming, presents an obvious model. The following section briefly
surveys the impact that IGRA has had on tribal-state relations in the
gaming arena. It goes on to discuss how the experience of IGRA might
inform a future model of (to use Skibine’s term) “cooperative trifederalism.”
1. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: History and Effects
IGRA was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision
in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,389 in which the Court
found that the State of California had no power to restrict tribal bingo
under either its inherent authority or under Public Law 280 (P.L. 280).390
P.L. 280, passed in 1953 when assimilationist sentiment was strong,
enabled states to opt into a regime granting them criminal (but not civil)
enforcement powers in Indian country. Notably, the Court’s P.L. 280
holding rested explicitly on the content of state law; the Court reasoned
that because California permitted some types of gambling, it had not
taken a strong public policy stance against it, and thus its laws regulating
bingo were not genuinely “prohibitory” enough to render them
enforceable against tribes under P.L. 280.391
Following the Court’s decision in Cabazon Band, many states
“lobbied furiously for passage of congressional legislation on Indian
gaming,”392 fearing both negative spillover effects (such as the
involvement of organized crime) and increased tribal competition for
state businesses.393 In response to those concerns, Congress enacted
IGRA in 1988. IGRA separated tribal gaming into three classes, out of
387. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (discussing Congress’s “Duro fix” restoring
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
388. Through P.L. 280, Congress bestowed criminal jurisdiction over Indian country upon states
that opted in. P.L. 280 was passed in the assimilationist Termination Era, has been strongly opposed
by tribes from the beginning, and is generally regarded as an abject failure from both the state and
tribal perspective. See Dimitrova-Grajzl, supra note 331.
389. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
390. Id. at 219–20.
391. See id. at 211.
392. See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and TribalState Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 48–49 (1997).
393. See id. at 49.
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which only the first—“social” or traditional games played for minimal
value—remained fully under tribal control.394 As to both remaining
categories, IGRA gave some role to states in determining the extent to
which tribal gaming would be permissible. Class II gaming, which
includes bingo and similar games,395 was made subject to explicit federal
oversight through the National Indian Gaming Commission, but it was
permissible in the first place only if “located within a State that permits
such gaming for any purpose.”396 Class III encompassed all other forms
of gaming, which Congress made subject to state input in two ways.
First, it permitted tribes to offer such games only pursuant to compacts
negotiated with states.397 However, states were required to negotiate only
with respect to gaming permitted in the surrounding state.398
In enacting IGRA, Congress provided a remedial scheme for the
statute’s violation that required abrogating state and tribal sovereign
immunity, a move thought at the time to be constitutionally permissible
as to both states and tribes.399 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,400
however, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Congress from abrogating sovereign immunity in
legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.401 This
decision was a serious blow to tribes’ equal footing under the statute. It
also created problems for the administration of IGRA, causing tribes—
now barred from suing states under IGRA—to turn to IGRA-subverting
measures, such as engaging in gaming outside the compact process, the

394. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2012); see also Tsosie, supra note 392, at 50 (“After the enactment of
the IGRA, the only category of Indian gaming that remains exclusively within tribal jurisdiction is
Class I gaming.”).
395. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A).
396. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
397. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
398. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B). A circuit split exists on how this measure should be interpreted. The
Second Circuit has applied the same framework that is used with respect to Class II games and
found that if a state permits any Class III games (such as blackjack), it must negotiate with respect
not only to that game but to other Class III games (such as, for example, slot machines). The Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, however, have taken the position that states must negotiate only with respect to
the particular games they allow—so a state allowing some forms of blackjack but banning slot
machines in all circumstances would only have to put the former on the table. See supra note 262.
399. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (finding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58
(1978) (finding that Congress may abrogate tribal sovereign immunity if it expresses its intent to do
so clearly).
400. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
401. See id. at 72–73.
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course ultimately pursued by the Seminole Tribe itself.402 Because IGRA
abrogates tribal immunity only for suits related to the IGRA process,
tribes remain immune for non-IGRA activities.
Reviews of IGRA today are mixed. Initially, “an overwhelming
majority of tribal leaders” were opposed to IGRA403 because it curtailed
tribal sovereignty both through the federal oversight over Class II games
and the requirement of state compacts for Class III games. More
recently, IGRA has also attracted criticism for inviting near-constant
litigation between tribe and states404 rather than, as Congress initially
hoped, facilitating smooth tribal-state relations.405 The Court’s decision
in Seminole Tribe has exacerbated both of these problems, spawning
litigation and giving state courts and state law disproportionate weight in
resolving legal disputes arising under IGRA.406 With few checks on their
role in the compact-negotiating process, states have at times exacted
concessions from tribes that go well beyond what Congress envisioned
as the proper scope of what should be subject to negotiation under
IGRA.407
Nonetheless, some commentators have reacted more positively to
IGRA, recognizing that, for all its flaws, it has played a vital role in
revitalizing the finances of many tribes.408 In addition, IGRA has also in
402. The Eleventh Circuit found that, because the tribe retained its sovereign immunity for
gaming outside the IGRA process, Florida was not permitted to sue the tribe for an injunction to
prevent such gaming. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 181 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir.
1999) (noting that the case “demonstrates the continuing vitality of the venerable maxim that
turnabout is fair play”).
403. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 254–55.
404. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 194 (calling IGRA “an experiment in permanent and
unremitting litigation”); Tsosie, supra note 392, at 52 (“Ironically, the compact procedure, which
was originally intended to avert contentious and expensive litigation, has resulted in more litigation
than any other provision of the IGRA.”).
405. See W. Ron Allen, IGRA Intended Better State/Tribal Relations, 17 INDIAN GAMING 14
(July 2007), http://www.indiangaming.com/istore/Jul07_SpeakOut1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KPUXCC2].
406. Kathryn R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts
Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 1006 (2007) (noting that,
as a result of the Seminole Tribe decision, disputes relating to IGRA are generally litigated in state
court, where “tribal authority and tribal interests . . . are literally absent”).
407. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 207–08 (noting that, despite congressional intent,
some states see the compact process as a “convenient vehicle to . . . stretch ever further from the
regulation of gaming activities” to include matters such as revenue sharing and collective
bargaining).
408. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 255 (recognizing that IGRA has flaws, but offering the
statute praise for the degree to which it has “inject[ed] badly needed revenues into reservation
economies”). Tribal gaming has grown from a $200 million annual industry in 1988, see id., to one
that produced $29.9 billion in revenue for tribes in fiscal year 2015, see NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
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practice helped to bring about positive examples of tribal-state
collaboration; states and tribes, for example, have productively
cooperated on measures to reduce smoking and provide resources for
problem gamblers.409 As one tribal chairman has noted, “The tribes were
never happy about how IGRA eroded our sovereignty . . . but we have
made it work.”410
2. IGRA, the Tribe-State Relationship, and Potential Reforms
For better or worse, a notable feature of IGRA is that it puts tribalstate relations at the forefront. IGRA is unusual among federal Indian
law legislation in mandating that tribes’ central relationship in the
gaming arena be not with the U.S. government—which has for almost
two centuries411 maintained a special trust relationship with tribes upon
which much federal Indian law doctrine is predicated—but with
states,412 which have sometimes been hostile to tribal sovereignty. Many
commentators have argued that IGRA’s failure to re-envision more
comprehensively tribes’ role in the constitutional scheme and to define
the relations between the states, tribes, and the federal government is at
best a missed opportunity, and at worst a fatal flaw.413 At least as to
Class III games, IGRA largely removes the federal government from the
process and attempts to redraw jurisdictional lines between tribes and
states—a move arguably at odds with Congress’s trust responsibility to
COMM’N, GROSS GAMING REVENUE TRENDING (2015), https://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/
reports/2015_Gross_Gaming_Revenue_Trending.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M4T-R3ML]. Tribes have
used gaming revenue to further revitalize their economies, funneling the money into public services,
infrastructure, social programs, housing construction, and many other endeavors. See Steven
Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, The Hand That’s Been Dealt: The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act at 20, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 425–27 (2009).
409. See Allen, supra note 405. Notwithstanding some successes, however, the question of
whether smoking should be tolerated in tribal casinos has at times been a point of friction between
states with smoking bans and tribes that have sometimes chafed at what they see as interference
with sovereign prerogatives. See, e.g., Kim Alford, Smoke-Free Policies: Protecting Tribal
Sovereignty and Community Health, NAT’L NATIVE NETWORK (Jan. 2012), http://www.nihb.org/
docs/02092012/tribal_sovereignty_smoke-free_policy_brief_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8NXD5J7]; John H. Douglas, Smoking Bans In Tribal Casinos: Health Issue or Labor’s Latest
Smokescreen Assault on Tribal Sovereignty?, INDIAN GAMING (May 1, 2008), http://www.indian
gaming.com/regulatory/view/?id=72 [https://perma.cc/EMZ8-YT9X].
410. See Allen, supra note 405.
411. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (first characterizing the tribal-federal
relationship in these terms).
412. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 256 (“IGRA is unique among all federal Indian legislation in
that it is the only national Indian legislation which included the states in the federal tribal
relationship and, in the process, attempted to balance the tribal and state interests.”).
413. See id. at 258–59.
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tribes.414 As a result of these criticisms, many proposals for reforming
IGRA suggest reimagining and clarifying the ways in which the three
sovereigns should interact—and preferably, in the process, restoring
tribes to their previous position of relative strength in the negotiating
process.415 Alex Tallchief Skibine has called for revisions of IGRA that
would incorporate principles of “cooperative tri-federalism: a version of
federalism involving the tribes, the federal government, and the
states.”416 For example, Skibine suggests, IGRA might be redrafted to
create a scheme under which the federal government would promulgate
generalized requirements for tribal gaming and then negotiate
individualized compacts with tribes pursuant to those guidelines.417
States would be represented in the initial compact negotiations and
would also have the chance to comment on the proposed compacts prior
to final approval.418
Notably, workarounds also exist for the new problem that has arisen
with IGRA in the wake of the Seminole Tribe419 decision—Congress’s
inability to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause and the consequent (if unintended) imbalance in state
and tribal powers under IGRA in its current form. Although recognizing
problems with this approach, Skibine suggests, for example, that the
statute might be rewritten to compel the U.S. Attorney General to sue
states that failed to negotiate with tribes in good faith.420 Further, due to
an odd twist of reasoning in Seminole Tribe, tribes would likely be able
to sue states for at least prospective injunctive relief under IGRA as long
as no alternative remedial scheme was clearly available or if Congress

414. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 188 (criticizing Congress for “not hesitat[ing] to
insert state authority into tribal affairs” in IGRA and elsewhere, “notwithstanding the notion that its
trust responsibility to tribes has been articulated as one to protect tribes from the states”); id. at 189–
90 (noting that IGRA purports to “adjust” state-tribal jurisdictional relationships).
415. For example, Gover and Gede acknowledge that states have legitimate concerns about tribal
gaming: “[i]ncreased vehicle traffic to and from the casino, overused and inadequate highways and
infrastructure, potential criminal activity in the area, increased demand on water, sewage, fire
protection, energy, and related needs.” Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 208. At the same time,
they argue, the aggressive ways in which states have sought to address these concerns have raised
“red flags for advocates of tribal sovereignty.” Id.
416. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 282.
417. See id. at 288.
418. See id.
419. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
420. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 292–93. Among the problems with this approach is that
“good faith” would require clearer statutory definition. See id.
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made plain its desire for Ex Parte Young421 (a limited exception to state
sovereign immunity) to apply.422
Kevin Gover and Tom Gede have made additional suggestions for
improving IGRA.423 These ideas include allowing tribes to regulate
independently (i.e., outside the compact process) any gaming activity in
which tribal law maps state law,424 and providing for an “opt in”
compact process for all other forms of gaming. 425 An even more farreaching reform would be to eliminate the compact requirement entirely
if the state allows any form of gaming at all.426
3. Lessons from IGRA
Just as federal law and the Constitution mediate the relationships
between states, in certain instances a federally created scheme could
help bring structure to the unsettled doctrine of tribal-state interaction.
Overall, tribes’ experience with IGRA suggests that there is room, in
some areas, for the federal government to establish and assist in a
negotiation-based model of state-tribal cooperation, provided it is done
in a way that is respectful to tribes and cognizant of IGRA’s mistakes as
well as its successes. Indeed, IGRA’s deficiencies could be useful in
helping to shape future legislation by illustrating the types of federal
supervision of the state-tribal relationship that are unneeded or
unhelpful.
Not all areas of tribal regulatory innovation, of course, clearly call for
such a model. In many areas, tribes can safely go their own way with no
particular effects on states or threats of state encroachment. For example,
because most people both inside and outside of Indian country shop for
groceries close to home, measures such as the Healthy Diné Nation Act
are unlikely to spark worries about spillovers or other extraterritorial
effects. At the same time, other areas of active tribal regulation, such as
marijuana legalization or environmental law, are already enmeshed with

421. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
422. Normally, the principle established in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits suits
for prospective injunctive relief against state officials who violate federal law. While ordinarily
Young would have permitted the tribe’s suit, in Seminole Tribe, the Court found that, because
Congress had created an alternative “detailed regulatory scheme,” 517 U.S. at 74, albeit one that
was in the Court’s view barred by the Eleventh Amendment, such relief was unavailable. See
Skibine, supra note 318, at 297–300 (discussing implications of Court’s reasoning).
423. See Gover & Gede, supra note 273, at 215–16.
424. See id. at 215.
425. See id. at 216.
426. See id. at 215–16.

09 - Florey.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/28/2017 2:35 PM

MAKING IT WORK

783

federal policies that may also have effects for states. Other areas, such as
gun regulation, are not as closely entwined with federal law but are
nonetheless rife with the possibility of tribal-state spillovers.
In these areas, tribal-state negotiation and agreement is clearly
desirable and necessary, and a case can be made for a limited federal
role in facilitating dialogue between states, tribes, and the federal
government. Further, regardless of the inherent desirability of federal
legislation or other involvement, it seems possible in some particularly
contentious areas, such as marijuana, that states or tribes will turn to the
federal government for help in resolving conflicts.
Should the United States take on such a role, it should attempt to learn
from states’ and tribes’ experiences with IGRA. It is important, for
example, that Congress start from a baseline of protecting the regulatory
powers tribes currently possess—in contrast to IGRA, which limited
tribes’ previously established right to engage in gaming where state law
did not express a clear public policy to prohibit it. Beyond this basic
starting point, proposed legislation or executive action should focus on
providing clear guidance to tribes, respecting tribal autonomy, and
facilitating state-tribal cooperation.427
Some of the ideas commentators have proposed for reforming IGRA
have additional value as a potential framework for new regulation.
While Alex Tallchief Skibine, for example, acknowledges that it “may
be too late in the day to reinvent IGRA” itself,428 some of his ideas—
such as his proposal of a predominantly federal-tribal compacting
process guided by federal regulations and assisted by state input429—
might be adapted as workable models in areas such as marijuana or gun
regulation. It is worth noting as well that, in the environmental arena, the
federal government has, with great success, facilitated local, autonomous
regulation by tribes.430
Finally, any federal proposal should give careful thought to potential
effects, intended or unintended, on the ability of tribal and state
regulation to function autonomously. IGRA links the question of the
scope of tribal gaming to the content of surrounding state law. In some
427. It is worth noting that the mixed signals sent by the federal government on marijuana
illustrate a policy that violates all three of these principles: after giving its tacit blessing to tribal
marijuana cultivation and legalization, the Department of Justice abruptly reversed course, and—
among other actions that sent tribes a confused message—cooperated with South Dakota officials in
a threatened raid on tribal crops that strained state-tribal relations. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
428. See Skibine, supra note 318, at 288.
429. See id.
430. See Warner, supra note 17, at 798 (discussing federal policy of promoting tribal autonomy).
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instances, as Kevin Washburn notes, this has had little effect on tribal
autonomy—some states have been happy to allow reservations to serve as
havens offering forms of gaming unavailable elsewhere in the states.431
But in other cases, as has happened to some degree in Wisconsin, tribal
power may be circumscribed by changes in underlying state law.432
By contrast, federal involvement in any other area of state-tribal friction
should start with the premise that tribes should enjoy at least as much
regulatory autonomy as they do now, and that tribes should be permitted
to depart from the law of the surrounding state if they so choose.
Inevitably, market forces may lead to state-tribal law convergence—as has
been the case with marijuana legalization in Washington—but there is no
reason for federal law to contribute to this process. Rather than trying to
enforce a uniform, state-driven policy upon tribes, any federal framework
should instead provide assistance to tribes and states in negotiating
conflicts and spillovers—on both the state and tribal sides—that result
from regulations that diverge.
CONCLUSION
In areas from environmental regulation to food policy, tribes are often
innovators that exemplify the Brandeisian laboratory ideal. In other areas,
such as marijuana and guns, tribes have attempted to develop unique
regulatory approaches but have run into problems because of gaps in their
sovereignty. In any case, tribal experimentation is likely to continue in the
future, creating the possibility for productive emulation of successful
tribal policies by states but also increasing the potential for friction and
negative spillover effects.
For tribal experimentation to be most successful, tribes need to be able
to regulate autonomously, without undue pressures by states, and with
powers that are clearly delineated and adequate to the task. With an
equally divided Supreme Court, the potential for reimagining the Montana
test is higher than it has been in decades; any such re-envisioning should
take into account the potential that tribal regulation offers. Meanwhile,
states, tribes, and perhaps the federal government should work to develop
for the state-tribal context equivalents of the comity-promoting doctrines
and practices that play a significant role in smoothing interstate relations.
While states have sometimes seen tribal independence in regulation as a
site of conflict, it can instead be a source of models and ideas from which
other jurisdictions can benefit.
431. See Washburn, supra note 264, at 294.
432. See supra notes 266–72 and accompanying text.

